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In an attempt to promote in-depth dialogue amongst bioethicists coming from 
distinct disciplinary and religious backgrounds this thesis offers an overview of the 
current state of bioethics and a critical analysis of a number of the leading methods of 
addressing pluralism in bioethics.  Exploring the critiques and methodological proposals 
coming from the social sciences, the contract theorists, and the pragmatists, this study 
describes the problems which arise when confronting moral and religious diversity in a 
bioethical context and examines the ability of these various methodologies to adequately 
resolve these matters. Finally, after a discussion of the benefits and the potential 
problems of each of the aforementioned schools, a methodological model labelled 
“Pragmatic Perspectivism” is set forth as a potential conceptual framework through 
which a bioethical theory for a secular yet religiously pluralistic society may be forged.   
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Preface 
 
On a sunny Tuesday in October 2005, Dr. Daniel Callahan and I strolled through 
the campus of the Yale Medical Center discussing the role of philosophy in bioethics.  
Wrapped up in our conversation, we arrived at our destination and entered the Alder 
Geriatric Assessment Center, where we were scheduled to meet with a physician who 
specialized in geriatric dementia-care.  At the time I had been interning at the Hastings 
Center for Bioethics after having just finished a master’s in the philosophy of mental 
disorder.  Knowing that I was interested in mental disorders and personal identity theory 
and that Dr. Walker held an interest in personal identity theory and worked with dementia 
patients on a daily basis, Dr. Callahan had invited me to join him on his expedition to 
Yale.   Having commenced our meeting, we examined the different stages of dementia 
and discussed a number of cases, discussing their philosophical implications and the 
potential uses of philosophical theory in clinical practice.  Raising issues regarding 
symptomatology and the progression of the disorder, our discussion was centered around 
the various ethical implications associated with different stages of dementia and how 
even in clinical practice certain philosophical concepts such as ‘free will’, ‘autonomy’, 
‘personhood’, and ‘diachronic identity’ (or identity over time) emerged, regardless of the 
language used to describe them.   
Discussing various philosophers, yet primarily dealing with the work of Derek 
Parfit, an eminent philosopher and personal identity theorist, I had made some 
suggestions regarding the constituents of identity and at which stages a dementia patient 
may in fact no longer be considered the same person.  In addition, I had suggested some 
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existential explanations of suffering which may be helpful in providing a framework for 
coping with suffering.  My suggestion was that if suffering imbued the life of the 
individual with some considerable degree of meaning it may have a value and, hence, a 
doctor should take into consideration the notion that stifling such suffering may prevent 
the patient from having a sort of existential revelation, so to speak. I went on to suggest 
that if the suffering of the individual could be said to possess no such existential benefit, 
then to allow its prolongation would be ethically unjustified.   However, while my 
philosophical reasoning, whether existential or analytic, was acknowledged as being 
sound, the monkey wrench in the gears of each of my arguments was the religious 
element; the religiosity and belief systems of patients stood in the way of my attempts to 
apply sound and uniform philosophical reasoning to their cases.   
With a religiously diverse inpatient populous, Dr. Walker informed me of how a 
number of individuals and their families relied on their religious backgrounds and beliefs 
when dealing not only with clinical ethical dilemmas but a plethora of issues surrounding 
notions of illness, suffering, and death as well.  It was clear to me that even if a 
philosophical definition of the person was supported by logical proofs and was able to 
theoretically resolve a number of problematic issues and even if an existential notion of 
suffering seemed to respect the subjective realm of values, there was data being presented 
to me which seemed to occlude their application in clinical practice.  Evidence of Muslim 
patients who held particular notions of the person and Catholics who valued suffering 
apart from its ability to ‘existentially enlighten’ the individual had been presented to me -
- notions which drew my attention to the fact that in the theoretical realm of biomedical 
ethics and in medical practice itself religiosity had been given a back row seat when in 
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fact it emerged on the frontlines of the decision-making process of patients, whose well-
being and opinions play a crucial role in both the medical and bioethical enterprises.  
That which I found lacking in mainstream philosophical secular reasoning was an 
ability to maintain a level of normative rigor while simultaneously being able to hold 
substantive respect for the beliefs and convictions of those who would be affected by any 
decision-making processes and the conclusions they produced.  While I was aware of 
religious factors in medical decision making before, that which became explicit was the 
fact that religious pluralism presents clinicians, bioethicists, and policy-makers alike with 
a real problem.  After leaving our meeting and contemplating such issues, it occurred to 
me that bioethicists are presented with the conceptually arduous task of attempting to 
hold ethical and procedural standards and principles while simultaneously respecting and 
seriously considering the religious beliefs of the patients whom such theorizing and 
policies will actually affect.  Hence, I decided further inquiry into the matter was needed 
and, ultimately, set out to resolve such problematic issues.     
  This study is in an attempt to promote a more in-depth dialogue amongst 
bioethicists coming from distinct disciplinary and religious backgrounds; to facilitate a 
greater comprehension of the distinct modes of moral reasoning which come into play in 
bioethical decision-making; and to explore the viability of forging a more pluralistic 
conceptual framework for bioethical inquiry.  
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Introduction 
 
Imagine for a moment that you are an observer in a room of the pediatric critical 
care unit of a hospital -- a fly on the wall, so to speak.  On the bed lays a boy who appears 
to be breathing with the aide of a machine yet is otherwise motionless.  His mother 
strokes his hand, and his father closes a prayer book which he has just been reciting from.  
Soon after, a physician walks in, holding a chart which bears upon it a number of test 
results.  As he converses with the parents, you learn that the doctor has performed a 
number of apnea tests which have confirmed that the boy will be unable to breath 
spontaneously if he is removed from the ventilator, electroencephalographic testing 
measuring the boy’s brain activity which has resulted in a flat-line reading, and tests 
confirming the absence of any cerebral blood circulation.  Regretfully, the doctor informs 
the parents that, due to their son’s profound coma, apnea, and the absence of his 
brainstem reflexes, his diagnosis, in accordance with the State’s laws, is ‘brain death.’  
The parents, rather offended, are quick to reply, protesting the doctor’s diagnosis on the 
grounds that they, as pious Orthodox Jews, do not believe in ‘brain death,’ nor do they 
believe that such a diagnosis should be equated with the death of a human person.   
The doctor and most of the hospital staff believe that the boy is dead based on the 
Uniform Determination of Death Act of 19801, the criteria of which are: irreversible 
cessation of all brain function or irreversible cessation of blood circulation.  Given their 
State’s employment of the above stated criteria, often referred to as the “Harvard 
Criteria,” the hospital staff wish to follow procedure, consider the boy dead, and follow 
                                                 
1 For more information regarding the Uniform Determination of Death Act see Kerridge et al, “Death, 
Dying, and Organ Donation,” 89-94. 
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typical hospital protocols for dealing with a dead patient. Uncertain of what to do, the 
physician requests that a clinical ethicist be sent in to ameliorate the situation.   
Armed with his knowledge of the widely accepted bioethical principles of 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice; medical policy, including a variety 
of standards for determining ‘brain death’, all of which would have been satisfied through 
the usage of the more conservative Harvard criteria2 (Pence 2004, 45); and his arsenal of 
philosophical logic, moral reasoning, and previously set precedents, the ethicist enters the 
situation.  After talking with the boy’s parents, he realizes that he will never be able to 
convince them of the acceptability of any brain death criteria and that if the hospital 
proceeds to treat the boy as dead his parents will be in a state of moral outrage.  What 
should be done?  Who, if any one, is ultimately correct: the doctor, the State, the parents? 
And how should the ethicist handle the situation?  What factors should come to play a 
role in his ethical decision-making: the secular ethical reasoning he was taught or the 
religious beliefs of the patient’s family?  
Moreover, what are you to do if you are a patient whose religious beliefs reject 
the ‘brain death’ standard of death in the face of its widespread acceptance amongst 
ethicists and clinicians? Further, in lieu of your religious convictions, what choices do 
you really have when confronted with laws that, at first glance, seem not only to oppose 
your beliefs but to force a label of ‘death’ upon your loved ones when you believe them 
to be alive?  Unless you live in New Jersey -- where a ‘consciousness clause’3 allowing 
                                                 
2 The three standard sets of criteria for determining brain death are, in order from most to least 
conservative: Harvard Criteria, Irreversibility Standard, and the Cognitive Criteria.  For more information 
regarding the criteria of brain death see Pence, Classic Cases in Medical Ethics, 44-46.   
3 New Jersey is the only state to hold an exemption to brain death on moral or religious grounds in a 
statutory law.  As quoted by Michael Grodin, the New Jersey statute of 1991 states, “The death of an 
individual shall not be declared upon the basis of neurological criteria…when such a declaration should 
violate the personal religious beliefs or moral convictions of that individual….” “Religious Exemptions,”  
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people to object to brain death standards on religious grounds has been accepted by the 
State -- the state, the hospital, or the individual doctor has the power to determine the 
death of those whom your religion may view as still ‘alive’. 
While the preceding case is itself fictional, it is based on a number of real-life 
cases documented by Joseph J. Fins4 and Neil M. Lazar5 and raises problematic issues 
which patients, clinicians, policy-makers and ethicists are faced with on a daily basis.    
In addition to the case-based problems of dealing with brain-death, conceptually nebulous 
and ethically difficult problems arise in relation to a number of other medical issues, 
including psychiatric diagnosis6, treatment plans7, and others -- all of which call into 
question the beliefs, values, and morals of individuals, which may in many instances be 
in conflict with one another.   
Furthermore, particular instances of ethical uncertainty, conceptual ambiguity, 
and moral disagreement associated with religious differences, such as the case presented 
above, illuminate a greater overarching problem regarding the methodological 
foundations of bioethical inquiry: the fact that this is a secular yet religiously pluralistic 
society whose laws, health policies, and ethical principles are to remain free of religious 
convictions while adequately representing the pluralistic populous. In other words, how 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Journal of Church and State, 1994), 36:2, 7.  These statutes are often referred to as “conscience clauses.”  
For more information pertaining to the “conscience clause” of New Jersey see Kerridge et al, “Death, 
Dying, and Donation,” 89-94;  Veatch, “Impending Collapse Whole-Brain Death,” 18-24; or Chiong, Brain 
Death without Definitions,” 20-30. 
4 In “Clinical Pragmatism” (70-71), Joseph J. Fins presents a case in which a Hassidic Jewish child is being 
diagnosed with brain death and discusses the problems which ensue due to the moral and religious 
differences between the family and the clinicians. 
5 Lazar et al, “Brain Death,” 833-836. 
6 In “Neuroethics or Neuro-values” (297-313), Bill Fulford discusses the case of Simon, a secular lawyer in 
the South from a Baptist family, who began to have revelations.  Analyzing the case, Fulford proceeds to 
question the status and criterion of delusions.  
7 In “Cross-Cultural Settings” (6-14), Nancy Jecker and Joseph Carrese present cases illustrating the 
difficulties of diagnosis and treatment planning when confronted with the cultural and religious differences 
presented to a western clinician when dealing with a Navajo patient.  
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are we to confront the problem of religious pluralism, on both the theoretical and 
practical levels, in biomedical ethics? Ultimately, the questions raised by the 
aforementioned example are: “Is there room for religious convictions in bioethical 
discourse?” And if so, “How are they to be incorporated?” 
As a response to the potential dangers and abuses of scientific and medical 
advancements, bioethics has become a field of particular importance for contemporary 
society.  The rapid progress of modern medicine has provided both hope and despair for 
many; along with the benefits of medical advancements come new ethical and moral 
dilemmas.  Emerging from a plethora of backgrounds, numerous bioethicists have 
attempted to resolve these moral conflicts, clarify ethical ambiguities, and propose 
universal solutions to the medico-ethical dilemmas which have arisen from technological 
advancements in medicine.  However, while medical technology has created new ethical 
concerns, it has also opened up a new arena of moral conflict and diversity as distinct 
groups respectively respond to such issues.  Despite the variety of work that has been 
done thus far, many religiously oriented bioethicists fail to seriously take into 
consideration the beliefs of those coming from other religious traditions, while secular 
theorists fail to take into consideration the pertinence of the religious pluralism which 
pervades our society. While progress has been made in promoting interfaith and religio-
secular dialogue and there have been measures taken to address religious pluralism on the 
clinical, policy and pedagogical levels, the principles and theories that have traditionally 
guided policy and doctor-patient relations are largely a product of quasi-legalistic and 
rationalistic secular thinking. The problem is that, while ethical standards are necessary, 
the individuals who will be affected by such policies and standards are often guided by 
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their religious beliefs in their own ethical decision-making processes.  In recent years 
there seems to have been a renewed concern regarding methodological issues in bioethics 
which suggests that the time may be ripe for a re-evaluation of the role of bioethics in a 
pluralistic society and the role of religious perspectives in the bioethical arena.  
Seeking to lay the foundations of a pluralistic bioethics, the aim of this study is to 
explore the viability of such an endeavor and to provide methodological suggestions on 
how we can pursue such a task. We will begin with a brief historical overview of the 
relationship between religion and bioethics. Subsequently, a critical analysis of a number 
of the leading methods of addressing pluralism in bioethics will be provided. Lastly, 
methodological suggestions for creating a new conceptual framework will be set forth. 
First, employing clinical case studies and drawing upon the bioethical work of 
authors coming from distinct religious traditions and academic disciplines, this study will 
discuss the differences in modes of moral reasoning found within pluralistic societies and 
which enter clinical settings on a daily basis.  The case work psychiatrist and medical 
anthropologist Arthur Kleinmann, physician and clinical ethicist Joseph Fins, physician 
and bioethicist Neil Lazar, medical anthropologist and bioethical historians Carla 
Messikomer and Renee Fox, and others will be discussed to demonstrate the reality of the 
aforementioned problems on both the clinical and legislative levels.  In addition the work 
of bioethicists such as Tom Beauchamp, James Childress, Robert Veatch, Daniel 
Callahan, Leigh Turner, and Adam Hedgecoe will be discussed as a means of illustrating 
both the marginalization of religious voices in the bioethical arena and the conceptual 
difficulties religious pluralism has presented to bioethics on the theoretical level.    
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 Second, exploring the critiques and methodological proposals coming from the 
social sciences, such as those of Leigh Turner and Patricia Marshall; the contract 
theorists, such as Robert Baker and Donald Ainslie; and the pragmatists, such as Joseph 
Fins, this study will analyze the problems that arise when confronting moral and religious 
diversity in a bioethical context. In addition we will examine the ability of these various 
methodologies to adequately resolve a number of the aforementioned problems.  
Finally, having highlighted both the benefits and contributions, and the potential 
problems in both theory and practice, of each of the aforementioned schools, a 
methodological model I am calling a “Pragmatic Perspectivism,” which attempts to 
incorporate the benefits of and to avoid the problems with many of the previous 
methodologies, will be set forth. This model is meant to serve as a potential conceptual 
framework in which a bioethical theory for a secular yet religiously pluralistic society 
might be forged.  Drawing upon the work of Jeffery Stout and Ortega y Gasset, this 
method adopts, adapts, and synthesizes the respective insights of the two authors as to 
suggest an alternative way of addressing the problematic issues that religious pluralism 
poses for bioethical inquiry.   In addition, paying attention to both differences and 
similarities, various perspectives on brain death, including those of Greek Orthodox 
Christian theologians Stanley Harakas and Nikolaos Hatzinikolaou, Thomist philosopher 
and Catholic theologian Jason Eberl, Confucian bioethicist Ruiping Fan, Buddhist scholar 
Damien Keown will be explored as a means of demonstrating this new conceptual 
framework’s ability to resolve some of the problems that religious pluralism has raised in 
bioethics. These authors have been chosen based on the fact that a majority of them have 
addressed the same bioethical issue of brain death which enables the possibility of 
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imaging a dialogue between these authors and facilitates a detailed comparison on a 
specific issue.  In addition, each of these authors has been explicit in identifying the 
specific religious tradition he either claims to be representing or is drawing upon when 
formulating his position.  It is the hope of this author that this project will foster further 
interfaith and interdisciplinary dialogue on initiating new ways of engaging the issue of 
religious pluralism in bioethical theory and in clinical practice. 
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Chapter 1 
Religious Convictions 
&  
Bioethical Decisions 
 
In this chapter I will discuss the relationship between bioethics and religion, 
paying special attention to the problems which arise when confronting the phenomenon 
of religious and moral diversity from within a bioethical context. Before doing so, 
however, I would like briefly to summarize the role of religious thought in bioethics from 
its formative years in the late 1960s until today as means of further grasping the severity 
of the issue at hand, acquiring some historical insight, and better comprehending the 
nature of the methodologies being employed in contemporary bioethics.      
   
Religion’s Relationship with Bioethics 
 
With a strong theological presence in its formative years, bioethics has always 
had a relationship with religion.  This early contribution of religious thought in bioethics 
came primarily from theologians, mostly Jewish and Christian figures such as Paul 
Ramsey and Hans Jonas, however even then such figures were in dialogue with secular-
oriented philosophers.8  Despite the fact that both the religious and secular ethicists 
shared the common goal of seeking universal moral truths, the languages employed to 
express such universals were distinct and often hard to translate. Since the vocabularies 
of the theologians, or ‘religionists’, could be highly saturated with religious terminology 
                                                 
8 For more information regarding the history of bioethics and the relationship of bioethics and 
religion/theology see Messikomer et al, “Religion in American Bioethics,” 484-508, and Callahan, 
“Universalism & Particularism,” 37-44.  
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that could only be appreciated by members of their respective faiths, many of the 
religiously-oriented bioethicists, such as Leon Kass and Robert Veatch, spoke a secular 
language at the round-table of bioethics.  In what appears to have been an attempt to 
prevent miscommunication and misunderstanding, bioethical lingo took on a secular tone, 
leaving those who represented both religious and secular strains of thought in a position 
in which they could postulate arguments and defend their positions in a common 
vernacular (Messikomer et. al 2001).  
As bioethics developed further, universalistic ethical aims continued to dominate 
the field.  This eventually led to the rise of a variety of critics such as Joseph Fletcher, 
who wished to focus on the particulars of situations, contexts, and cases (i.e. 
situationalism, contextualism, relativism, and casuistry).9  However, the failure of these 
schools to provide adequate normative principles that could actually guide actions and set 
the standards which were necessary in a field involved with policy-making led to their 
marginalization. A universalist ethical agenda and the secularization of moral concepts 
pervaded the field, eventually culminating in the popularity of Tom Beauchamp’s and 
James Childress’s universalistic Principles of Biomedical Ethics, which will be discussed 
in further detail at a later point in the study.  
While the concerns of the particularists remained prevalent, universalistic 
principalism tended to be seen as the most effective means of dealing with these 
                                                 
9 None of the schools of thought which Callahan has dubbed “Particularist” accept universal moral claims, 
however, there are distinctions to be had amongst these various schools of thought.  Situationalists maintain 
that in order for a sound moral judgment to occur the particulars of each situation must be accounted for; 
they do believe that a correct moral judgment can be made in regards to specific situations.  Contextualists 
claim that historico-cultural factors must be taken into consideration prior to a moral judgment.  Relativists 
claim that moral truths depend upon either a specific culture or are contingent upon the beliefs of 
individuals. This is usually referred to as subjectivism. Casuists claim that moral decisions should be based 
upon the outcomes and antecedent judgments of prior similar cases.  They maintain that cases should serve 
as precedents for moral decision-making and only when cases are unique should new moral judgments 
come into play.  Callahan, “Universalism & Particularism,” (Hastings Center Report, 2000), 30:1, 37-44. 
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tumultuous issues. This has led not only to the exclusion of those employing religious 
language, though not always those with a religious agenda, but also of those whose 
religious belief systems and correlative systems of morality do not conform to the widely 
accepted modes of reasoning present within today’s secularized and rationalized ethical 
discussions from the mainstream currents in the field, as some such as Leigh Turner 
would argue.10  Despite the fact that in recent years there has been a growing 
dissatisfaction with universalistic and principalistic methods, an exclusionary attitude 
towards religious modes of reasoning continues to be held, expressed, and perpetuated by 
a number of leading figures in bioethics.  For instance, the preeminent ethicist and 
bioethicist, Mary Warnock, writes,  
Though religious beliefs may be the foundation for private morality and 
therefore supply such morality with inviolable principles, it has no such 
role in the case of public policy-making, even where the policy is 
concerned with matters agreed to be matters of morality.  It could have 
such a role only if the certainty of the principles supplied by religion were 
generally shared, or were held themselves to be enforceable by law (i.e. in 
a theocratic state)….This is not to suggest that church people, whether lay 
or clerical, should not speak on public policy issues….But moral 
arguments if they are to be listened to in a democracy must be just that: 
moral arguments.  They should be weighed up, assessed and acted on 
because they have persuaded on moral grounds not because of any 
connection they may have with particular theological doctrines….  
(Warnock 2005, 33-41)    
 
 
This statement explicitly expresses the position in bioethics that there is a single mode of 
moral reasoning, or at least a single correct mode of moral reasoning, to which all must 
conform if they are to be heard at all. Such an attitude effectively endorses a belief in the 
universal and neutral nature of a particular mode of reasoning. Moreover, it seems to 
imply that ‘true’ moral reasoning is without context and disconnected from a given 
                                                 
10 Turner, “Bioethics and Religions,” 181-197. 
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paradigm of thought, which as we shall see is a debatable claim. For many religious 
individuals religion and morality are seen as inseparable.  
To further illustrate the overarching problems of the under-representation of 
religious voices in the bioethical arena and the necessity of current trends to incorporate 
these voices into the biomedical ethical discourse, I would like to introduce the work of 
Carla Messikomer, Renee Fox, and Judith Swazey who have each done work in the 
anthropology and history of bioethics. 
Demonstrating that even in a time when efforts to embrace pluralism have been 
made, an exclusionary attitude toward religion in bioethics is still present.  Illustrating 
this point, Messikomer et al discuss and quote Childress’s position:  
While religious viewpoints are important for “stimulating the public 
imagination,” Childress said, he believes that a rationally based 
philosophical mode of reflection is the appropriate set of premises to use 
for his “model of public reasoning and justification” or “justification to 
others,” if one is thinking about “how to help a …secularly-based public 
institution…[in a] liberal, democratic, pluralistic society.” (Childress 
1999; Messikomer et al 2001, 502)  
 
Discussing national bioethics commissions, particularly the National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission (NBAC), Messikomer and Fox document that recently an attempt 
to incorporate religious voices has been made, however, he states, “the role that religious 
testimony and thought played in shaping the NBAC report on human stem cell research, 
and in the conclusions and recommendations it set forth, seems to have been both 
marginal and nebulous” (Messikomer et. al 2001, 504).  In addition, “In the report’s 
finale, religion has been expunged by being reduced to ‘diverse perspective,’ ‘ethical 
issues,’ and ‘moral concerns’” (Messikomer et. al 2001, 505).  In a more optimistic tone, 
Fox states, “The number of medical schools whose curricula include courses in 
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spirituality have grown (Pulchaski and Larson 1998) and centers, institutes, and interest 
groups on religion, spirituality, and medicine have been established in medical as well as 
divinity schools of some distinguished non-denominational universities” (Messikomer et 
al. 2001, 506).    
Hence, I ask, is there a way to embrace moral and religious diversity in 
biomedical ethics which can resolve some of the tensions which come with the pluralistic 
territory?  If there is a way of resolving the problems religious pluralism has presented to 
the bioethical enterprise, what would it entail? And, if we are presented with multiple 
candidates, which is the best one?  
 
The Problem 
 
Bioethics emerged in part as a response to society’s need and demand for the 
existence of ethical restraints upon scientific and medical innovations and practices. In 
addition, bioethics deals with a plethora of ethically questionable and conceptually 
nebulous issues raised by such advances in medical technology. Today, bioethics is left in 
a bit of a quagmire. Bioethicists find themselves in the difficult position of 
simultaneously regulating ‘ethically harmful’ practices while attempting to respect the 
diversity of the population which it is attempting to protect and represent in the first 
place.  The problem has been nicely stated by Daniel Callahan:  
How are we as a community, dedicated to pluralism, to find room for the 
different values and moral perspectives of different people and different 
groups? How are we to respect particularism? [and]…how as a community 
made up of diverse individuals and groups to find a way to transcend 
differences in order to reach a consensus on some matters of common 
human welfare? How, that is are we to respect universalism?...[For] There 
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can be no culturally and psychologically perceptive ethics without taking 
into account the diversity of moral lives, but there can be no ethics at all 
without universals…. (Callahan 2000, 37-38)   
  
Given this commonly held attitude regarding the relationship between ethics and 
universals and secularism’s dominance in bioethical theory, the most widely accepted 
approach to bioethical thinking has been universalism of the principalist sort -- that is, of 
the sort which claims to have discovered universally applicable ethical principles which 
retain their truth value regardless of socio-cultural, religious, or historical context.   
Inspired by the synthesis of rule-base utilitarian and deontological thought, Tom 
Beauchamp and James Childress, as noted above, have constructed a widely accepted set 
of ‘universal’ principles, namely autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice.  
Despite their dominance, these principles and the theories employed for their creation 
have received an onslaught of critiques coming from other universal-oriented schools of 
thought, such as Kantians, Virtues Theorists, Christian Ethicists and other religiously-
oriented ethicists, and from a variety of what Callahan has deemed the "particularist" 
camps and movements, mentioned previously.  However, despite the criticisms launched 
by the particularists their arguments often take a backseat due to particularism’s 
potentiality for a creating a slippery slope towards relativism and the threat of moral 
chaos which ensues.   
The practical concern is that if morality is indeed culturally relative, or relative to 
the individual as some postmodernists would claim, then how is bioethics to perform its 
regulatory function of curbing potentially ‘harmful’ effects of scientific progress, 
safeguarding the rights of patients, and discovering the morally right actions and ethical 
behaviors which spawned the field in the first place? The entire agenda of bioethics 
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would be undermined and the project of doing bioethics would fall by the wayside.   On 
the other hand, the theoretical concern held by the more philosophically-inclined 
bioethicists is that relativism as a theory is self-negating, and hence an unsound and 
absurd position.    
Confronting moral diversity and religious pluralism in bioethics raises the spectre 
that any principles which attempt to respect the claims of all religious groups will either 
not succeed in achieving their intended goal or they will be too vague to accomplish any 
substantive results, possessing no practical usefulness or applicable proposals.  “The hard 
part is to devise a theory that can readily join universality and the moral complexity of 
everyday life” (41 Callahan). This is precisely the issue which we shall explore and the 
very task at hand.   
Since the turn of the millennium, there have been a number of attempts to devise a 
theory which could provide solutions to the so-called universalism vs. particularism 
dilemma in bioethics.  As we proceed we will examine the viability of these alleged 
solutions, exploring their ability to adequately resolve the problems presented to bioethics 
by a religiously pluralistic society.  After a detailed and critical analysis, it will be 
demonstrated how some of the best attempts at resolving the problem of pluralism in 
bioethics ultimately fail, or fall short of their goal.  Therefore, after such an examination, 
a new approach to the resolution of such problems will be proposed and defended in an 
attempt to retain the insights of previous theories while avoiding their downfalls.       
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Chapter 2 
Moral Diversity 
vs.  
Bioethical Normativity: 
Overcoming the Problem 
 
 
At this point we will explore a number of critiques of universalistic and 
principalistic bioethical methodologies and will examine a few methodological proposals 
for coming to terms with pluralism in bioethics. The critiques and proposals to be 
addressed will be those of the social scientist bioethicists, such Leigh Turner, Adam 
Hedgecoe, and Renee Fox; the contract theorist bioethicists, such as Robert Baker and 
Donald Ainslie; and the pragmatist bioethicists, such as Matthew Bacchetta and Joseph 
Fins. Examining the ability of these various methodologies to adequately resolve the 
aforementioned problems between bioethical normativity and moral diversity, we will 
discuss the benefits and contributions, and the potential problems in both theory and 
practice, of each of the aforementioned schools.   
 
Ethnographic Bioethics: 
The Social Sciences to the Rescue 
 
Having been the least represented group in the bioethical arena, ethnographic 
bioethics has witnessed a surge since the turn of the millennium. Bringing socio-cultural 
and ethno-religious factors to the forefront, a number of social scientists have launched 
critiques of the current state of bioethical theorizing. This type of bioethical inquiry 
consists of individuals such as Renee Fox, mentioned previously; anthropologist Barry 
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Hoffmaster; Leigh Turner, a scholar of religion and bioethics at McGill University; 
Andrew Fagan of the Humans Rights Centre at the University of Essex; Adam Hedgecoe, 
a sociologist at the University of Sussex; and Patricia Marshall, an anthropologist in 
medical humanities at Loyola University. Voicing their concern over the failure of 
mainstream bioethics to adequately recognize the panoply of moral claims coming from 
distinct religious traditions, some of these critics have been rather antagonistic toward 
mainline analytic bioethical theory while others have merely attempted to provide 
correctives and to suggest a cooperative situation in which rationality and empirical 
social scientific evidence are seen as complementary.  
Nonetheless they are all united in their call for the further involvement of 
religious voices in the bioethical arena, their desire to prevent the ethno-centricism which 
ensues from the current principalistic and universalistic bioethical models, and their 
promotion of raising awareness and understanding of the various belief systems and 
modes of moral reasoning which pervade a pluralistic society like our own. Hedgecoe 
states: 
The social science critique claims that traditional philosophical bioethics 
gives a dominant role to idealized, rational thought, and tends to exclude 
social and cultural factors, relegating them to the status of irrelevancies.  
Another problem is the way in which bioethics assumes social reality 
divides down the same lines/categories as philosophical theories. 
(Hedgecoe 2004, 120) 
 
Also voicing his concern with the dominance of philosophical theory in bioethics, yet 
going one step further to demonstrate the problems with universalism and principalism, 
in particular, Turner states:  
Although Beauchamp and Childress situate their principalist moral 
framework in relation  to the work of Kantians, utilitarians, virtue 
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theorists, communitarians, and casuists, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
does not explore varieties of moral life as human experience unfolds in 
particular social settings….Instead, the principalist model of practical 
reasoning promotes a dualistic account of morality, whereby reasonable, 
sensible “common morality”, is distinguished from unreasonable, 
provincial “customary morality.” (110 Turner 2003, 11.2: 110)  
 
Though speaking with distinctive voices, a common claim of the social science-
oriented bioethicists is that mainstream bioethics, for the most part, has failed to seriously 
address the need for coming to terms with religious and cultural pluralism.  Many of the 
social scientists maintain that little attention has been paid to non-secularized religious 
claims due to their incompatibility with secular rationality, and that many of the more 
philosophically-inclined bioethicisits become wary of properly embracing pluralism due 
to the moral relativism which it may be perceived to entail.  In order for the variety of 
religio-cultural voices to be heard in this field, they have called for an ‘anthropological 
turn’ in bioethics. 
 One of the greatest problems facing the incorporation of non-secularized religious 
voices into the bioethical dialogue is that “in many traditions…moral norms cannot be 
discerned merely through sustained rational inquiry” (Turner 2003, 11.3: 187). Turner 
claims that in religiously pluralistic societies we are faced with “multiple interpretive 
traditions within which moral reasoning can proceed” (Turner 2003 11.3: 195).   
However, from my own observations and analysis, it appears that thus far the only 
modes of reasoning which contemporary mainstream bioethics has seriously considered 
and attempted to synthesize are the various analytic modes of thought, presented by 
science, philosophy, and law; essentially relegating religious claims to the realm of the 
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‘unreasonable’, ‘irrational’, or ‘unjustified’, or requiring a secularization of their 
terminology as to make theological arguments more palatable for a general audience.11  
Bioethics must come to the realization that “in postmodern, pluralistic societies, 
different webs of moral reasoning exist” (Turner 2003 11.3: 195) and do its best to 
accommodate this phenomenon rather than sweeping it away with an allegedly 
universalized rationalistic mode of inquiry and set of principles. Prima facie, it is not 
impossible for bioethics to incorporate ethnographic data into bioethical inquiry in order 
to promote a better understanding of diverse paradigms of thought, nor is it necessarily 
impossible for bioethics to accommodate diverse modes of reasoning while still 
maintaining an appropriate degree of normative rigor.     
The neglect of the social sciences by mainstream bioethics may in part be due to 
the fact that it has been ethnographic data which has given rise to relativism amongst 
some anthropologists and members of the general public.  Often philosophers view 
relativism as a self-negating philosophical theory, for if all truth claims are relative then 
there is nothing left to support the truth of the claim they are making. Relativistic 
positions are usually construed as philosophical slippery slopes toward moral chaos, 
                                                 
11 However, while requiring that religious thinkers secularize their language prior to engaging in bioethical 
discourse may appear to be a means of respecting diverse religious points of view while maintaining a 
neutral platform upon which dialogue may occur, such a method is potentially problematic on a number of 
levels. First, a number of religious claims may only make sense within the context of their respective belief 
systems, which when expressed in secular terminology may be unable to convey the full meanings of such 
concepts and may hinder an interlocutor’s ability to adequately comprehend the ideas being expressed by 
those speaking from a religious perspective. Second, hermeneutical obviation aside, one may claim that the 
very act of altering one’s language may overtime alter one’s mode of reasoning as well, for terms are 
symbolic expressions of particular ideas. Subsequently, the usage of certain terms is correlative with the 
expression of particular concepts.  Hence, through the alteration of language we may actually run the risk 
of altering one’s mode of reasoning as well, insofar as the language employed has a bearing upon one’s 
mode of conceptualization and the constant usage of certain terms may actually reinforce the prevalence of 
such concepts in one’s thought process.  Ultimately, by secularizing his/her terminology an individual may 
actually come to secularize his thinking, and hence leaving him/her in a position in which they are no 
longer adequately representing the modes of reasoning and conceptual paradigms of the religious tradition 
which they had represented in the first place.      
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hence making them unlikely candidates for any field of applied ethics.  However, the 
findings of the social sciences need not necessarily be taken as endorsements of 
relativism, but rather as data which point to real-life problems, modes of thinking, and 
values held by actual persons in our society. 
The problem lies within the conflation of empirical evidence and philosophical 
theory.  What the social scientists are stating is not necessarily a philosophical argument 
but is rather a presentation of data acquired from evidence-based methodologies and is 
representative of an empirical reality.  Whereas relativism is a doctrine, moral pluralism 
is a real social phenomenon supported by empirical evidence.  While relativism may be 
easily discarded in the ivory tower, the fact that there exists an array of moral beliefs 
stemming from different modes of moral thinking is the socio-cultural reality that an 
applied ethics must confront.  Simply writing off a variety of moral beliefs as wrong or 
false does not change the fact that the very people that bioethics is to be guiding and 
protecting actually do hold distinct and often conflicting moral commitments. Indeed, in 
clinical settings and in bioethical policy-making, conclusive decisions need to be made, 
however, in doing so, the moral diversity of our social reality must not be overlooked or 
marginalized when engaging in these deliberative processes.  
What is needed, and I believe is becoming more prevalent amongst bioethicists, is 
“a recognition that for many individuals and communities, it is these religious traditions, 
as opposed to particular philosophical theories, that are salient when they address moral 
issues related to medicine, illness, and health care” (Turner 2003 11.3: 184).  
Recognizing such phenomena need not entail an endorsement of nihilistic relativism nor 
does it necessarily require an epistemological judgment of the variety of claims being 
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purported.  Rather bioethicists must search for ways in which diverse perspectives can be 
respected while still maintaining a normative structure of inquiry which will be able to 
produce guidelines for action. 
The ability of the social sciences to provide ethnographic data to those involved in 
bioethical decision-making and policy formation can provide a platform upon which a 
synoptic understanding of difference and a fruitful discussion, rather than a myopic 
dismissal of alterity, may be had. This is where the social sciences can offer their greatest 
contribution to the interdisciplinary field of biomedical ethics – namely, by providing 
detailed descriptive accounts of religio-cultural contexts and the modes of moral 
reasoning which such patients and groups employ.  The “traditional orientation of 
anthropology toward moral questions complements analytical approaches currently being 
developed in bioethics by placing values and ethics squarely with the domain of culture” 
(Marshall 1992, 56).  As our society becomes increasingly more pluralistic, the social 
sciences can benefit bioethics greatly by assisting in, and promoting, a deeper 
understanding of religio-cultural difference. However, it is doubtful that the social 
sciences can provide the entire solution to problem.  
While the claims of the social scientists should be duly noted and their findings 
should be given a higher degree of consideration in the field – that is to say if bioethics is 
to be representative of the pluralistic populous, then the very descriptive nature of the 
field which gives it its usefulness in addressing the dilemma of religious pluralism 
simultaneously highlights its inadequacies to engage in the normative ethical inquiry 
which is characteristic of the ‘ethics’ in ‘bio-ethics’.  What is needed is a methodology 
which can incorporate such findings into bioethical analysis yet which can also succeed 
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in producing standards and guidelines; however, this is precisely what the social sciences, 
lacking a normative agenda, fail to provide. Marshall states: 
  
Though both anthropologists [social scientists] and bioethicists would 
profit from an open exchange of intellectual ideas and methodology…the 
relationship between bioethics and the social sciences as a whole still 
remain strained and tentative…. (Marshall 1992, 57)    
 
Hence, it seems that a discursive and dialogic methodological re-formulation of the initial 
stages of bioethical inquiry will be our best means of addressing, and hopefully resolving, 
the problematic features of pluralism, for such a method will be able to incorporate such a 
plurality of perspectives into a single framework. Yet, it is only after a methodology has 
been established that the contributions of the social sciences can truly take effect. 
I would like now to turn our attention to some popular attempts to construct such 
a methodology.  In our analysis we will examine methodological attempts at reconciling 
pluralism with the normative structure of bioethics, critically exploring their ability to 
accomplish such an arduous task. 
      
Bioethical Contract Theory 
 
Pluralism is often seen as a problem for ethics in general and indeed there have 
been a number of theoretical and methodological attempts to solve this problem.  One of 
the most influential of these attempts has been that of John Rawls.  From philosophical 
ethics to political theory, the impact of Rawls’ contractualism has been heavily endorsed 
by those seeking to preserve principled standards while simultaneously respecting 
diversity of belief.  Since Rawls, other contract theorists have made their mark on a 
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number of academic and applied fields.  Though branded with a different name, David 
Gauthier’s contractarianism has also been a major player in the field of pluralistic moral 
resolution.  Gauthier’s modified contractarian theory has been lauded as a means of 
combating the ever present threat of relativism while simultaneously paying homage to 
the moral diversity which pervades our society.  In bioethics, both Donald Ainslie and 
Robert Baker have employed contract theories as a means of responding to pluralism and 
overcoming any relativistic tendencies which may emerge in a pluralist-friendly theory of 
biomedical morality.   
Although their proposals are highly distinctive, the contract theorists12 and social 
scientists share a common thread in their respective agendas, namely their critical attitude 
toward moral absolutism, ethical realism, and the inherent universalistic agenda of the 
moral theories espoused by various sorts of principalism.   By seriously taking religio-
cultural and moral pluralism into consideration, contract theory relies on neither moral 
absolutism nor a set of universal principles.  Robert Baker has made this point explicit in 
his call for a contractarian renovation of bioethics as a means of properly dealing with 
postmodernity’s pluralistic landscape: 
If international [or a pluralistic] bioethics is to respond successfully to the 
challenges of multiculturalism and postmodernism, it must abandon moral 
fundamentalism.  It also must take stock of the three lesson to be learned 
from the failure of fundamentalism: (1) the difference claim cannot be 
explained away; there are fundamental differences in moral principles and 
values both between and within cultures; (2) any attempt to obviate these 
cultural or interpretive differences by postulating an acceptance of 
common or universal principles at some more ‘basic’ or ‘fundamental’ 
level is ultimately question-begging; (3) international biomedical ethics 
must rest on a theoretical framework that can bridge perspectives even as 
                                                 
12 Though some may argue that contractarians and contractualists are distinct breeds of contract theory, I 
find that these differences are minimal in the greater context of ethical theory. Hence, for our current 
purposes I will be treating them as representatives of the same tradition, leaving any discussion of their 
unique nuances for another time. 
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it justifies genuine transcultural and transtemporal moral judgments. 
(Baker 1998a, 225) 
 
While contract theorists do indeed seek to forge a normative morality, it must be 
understood that the moral codes of which contract theorists speak have to do with the 
principles for cooperation that rational agents do, or would, agree to under certain 
conditions.  Whereas the universalists, or as Baker refers to them, 
fundamentalists/absolutists, maintain that a given set of principles, norms and rules 
should reign supremely due to their universality and immutability -- and hence, are able 
to resolve various moral disagreements through appeals to a ‘moral law’ or common 
moral frame of reference (i.e. Beauchamp and Childress) – contractualists are not 
proposing any such set of absolute moral codes. In regards to coping with religious 
pluralism in bioethics, Ainslie claims, “What Rawls helps us to see is that the task of 
bioethics is not to resolve these disagreements, but to see what policy can be justified to 
people despite their disagreements” (Ainslie 2002, 14).   
Rather than proposing a definitive set of universal principles, that which the 
contractualists have developed is a method for 1) discerning those terms of cooperation 
that rational self-interested agents would agree are morally advantageous to all parties 
participating in the cooperative endeavor, and 2) implementing such agreed upon terms in 
an objective structure for moral systems.  This is a method by which groups of 
individuals may construct a set of rules based upon those values which they mutually 
perceive to hold primacy in the face of an abundance of eclectic values. For after all, 
“Why must others, in their struggles with reproduction, disease, suffering, and death, 
conform to principles over which some philosophical theories happen to coincide” 
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(Ainslie 2002, 4)?    Contract theorists maintain that through a process of rational 
deliberation each individual will arrive at the conclusion that the structure of the 
contractual cooperative agreement is best suited to accomplish such a task.   
The driving force behind such theories are the notions of bargaining and 
negotiation; self-interest and rationality; and what Rawls referred to as “reasonable 
pluralism,” or the idea that those individuals possessing conflicting, yet reasonable, moral 
doctrines are able to come to the bargaining table and negotiate rationally with one 
another.  “Contractarian moral and political theory concludes that cooperation between 
such agents is possible – despite fundamental conflicts of interests, principles, and values 
– provided that the conflicting parties appreciate their own rational self-interest in 
enjoying the advantages of cooperation” (Baker 1998b, 235).  While a number of distinct 
voices are to be present at the contractualist’s bargaining table, the conversation is 
exclusive to the extent that those individuals or groups whose moral claims, and 
correlative doctrines, may be judged to be ‘unreasonable’ will be prevented from joining 
the negotiation process. Yet, how does a contractarian categorize a doctrine as 
‘unreasonable’?  Ainslie’s reply is that: 
An unreasonable comprehensive doctrine leads its subscribers to reject the 
idea of cooperation with those whose comprehensive doctrines differ from 
theirs. It is people who are intolerant in this sense – in their unwillingness 
to live peacefully, on terms of acceptable to all, among those with whom 
they have moral disagreements…Accordingly,…the state [or in this case 
the bioethical community]can legitimately take steps to prevent those with 
unreasonable comprehensive doctrines from interfering with the lives of 
others. (Ainslie 2002, 15)  
  
How does this method function? And what forms its foundational basis if not a rationally 
or divinely inspired set of universal moral truths?  
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Meta-ethically speaking, having drawn upon the insights of Locke and Hobbes, 
contractarians paint a picture of human nature, albeit a rather pessimistic one, asserting 
that all agents have a deep sense of self which is comprised of a variety of conflicting 
preferences and a self-interested motivation for action.  Baker illustrates just how crucial 
such a conception of human nature is to the contractarian paradigm stating that, 
“[I]ntegral to the metaphor of the social contract is the contractarian recognition that the 
interests of the parties who contract to form civil society are naturally in conflict (or, as 
Hobbes put it, at war with each other)…” (Baker 1998b, 234-235).     
Such a matrix of conflicting preferences leads one to a decision-making process, 
which is based upon what Gauthier refers to as deliberative justification, as a means of 
extracting those preferences that the individual deems to be of lesser value when conflict 
occurs.  Deliberative Justification states that an agent’s choices are justified if they 
maximize the agent’s expected utility.  This, he claims, does not depend upon any moral 
considerations; for only in a community setting does morality arise. Gauthier claims that 
rational agents will analyze their conflict ridden situation, realizing that it could be 
otherwise.  Thus, when placed within a community setting, that which each rational 
agent’s process of deliberative justification shall conclude is the principle of Constrained 
Maximization. Due to its ability for maximizing one’s own utility by means of 
cooperation, such a principle would be accepted by the rational agent.   
 Thus, all rational agents involved come together to form a cooperative bargain. 
During such a negotiation, each individual brings his/her primary preferences to the table.  
In such a process, individuals will be able to discover where exactly their set of values 
and preferences match, or hold similarity to, those of others.  Negotiating will enable 
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them to formulate a set of values that they can all agree hold primacy over others (in 
much the same way that the individual had done previously when assessing her own 
preferences).  That which is discovered is the link unifying the various subjective views 
from which they may establish a set of terms that will be agreeable to all. Ultimately 
what we are presented with is a negotiated moral order, which is flexible enough to 
undergo change and be re-negotiated at a future time.  
While the contractarians’ attempt to forge a middle ground between universalism 
and particularism in ethics is laudable, there are a few problematic features of their 
proposed methodology.  First, like the secular fundamentalists and principalists, contract 
theory relies on ethnocentric values and a westernized conception of rationality to do the 
work of forging cross-cultural norms.  Not all religio-cultural traditions value deliberative 
rationality or individualistic notions of self-interest in the way in which the contractualist 
paradigm requires.   
Second, the entire contractarian method not only presupposes but is grounded in a 
conception of human nature which may be unacceptable to the potential parties involved 
yet which is integral to the functionality of the contractualist methodology. When one is 
attempting to resolve the moral conflicts that arise in a religiously pluralistic society, 
adhering to a theory which is contingent upon the acceptance of a particular conception 
of human nature does not appear to be the most inviting way to bring individuals to the 
bargaining table. A variety of both religious and non-religious conceptions of the human 
do not view human nature as self-interested, monadic, and combative. Thus once these 
allegedly innate traits are denied by certain parties involved, it seems that there is no 
good reason to accept the social contract, for rational self-interest and conflict are those 
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factors which allegedly motivate us to enter into a cooperative contractual situation in the 
first place.    
Third, contract theory’s legalistic edge requires bargaining and negotiation, which 
may work well in some areas of business, law, and politics; however, when applied to 
bioethics what contract theory ultimately asks is for individuals to bargain not with their 
interests but rather with their beliefs about the nature of reality.  Insofar as advances in 
medical technologies have raised issues that have called into question those beliefs which 
are constitutive of our perspectives of ontological reality, it is not merely a question of 
negotiating the rightness of an act, but entails probing our conceptions of life, death, the 
meaning of illness and suffering, and human nature. What the contractarian bioethicists 
fail to take into consideration is, as Lisa Rasmussen has duly noted, that “There are many 
metaphysical decisions that must be made in bioethics” (Rasmussen 2000, 375) and that 
metaphysical beliefs are hardly as negotiable as contract theory requires them to be.  
Accepting these theories necessarily entails either conflating interests/preferences with 
beliefs systems and worldviews, or assuming that metaphysical and ontological beliefs 
are arbitrary and negotiable, which is a question-begging claim to say the least. 
Take a case of brain death, for instance. What a contract model of bioethics would 
entail for creating a policy in regards to brain death is that the parties involved would 
have to negotiate a definition of death; consequently, negotiating a conception of 
personhood as well.  Subsequently, it would ask the parties involved to bargain with their 
metaphysical and ontological beliefs, essentially asking people to treat such beliefs, 
which are constitutive of their worldviews and conceptions of self, as if they were mere 
preferences and not staples of their conceptions of reality itself. However, if as Ainslie 
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claims, “bioethicists should not be in the business of forcing their own private moral 
views on others” (Ainslie 2002, 27), how could it be fair and acceptable for them to 
impose their metaphysical and ontological conceptions of human nature upon others?  If 
contract theorists wish to protect individuals against being forced to accept a foreign 
private morality, they too must be careful not to impose their own private ontological 
views upon others.   
Moreover, all metaphysics aside, without taking seriously enough that rational 
deliberation is not equally valued across cultures, contract theorists endorse a single 
mode of reasoning – namely, deliberative rationality. Ultimately this mode of reasoning 
succeeds in occluding any individual who will not accept either the contractarians’ initial 
premises or values -- namely that self-interested rational deliberation should be valued 
above all else.  The contractarian method asks individuals to negotiate their values in 
order to arrive at a mutually shared set of values and norms yet presupposes that valuing 
rational deliberation is a trans-cultural and trans-religious phenomenon before entering 
into the process which is itself supposed to discover where such commonalities reside. It 
presupposes at the outset that which is to be an outcome.       
Despite the inherent flaws of the contractarian method, and its inadequacies at 
resolving the dilemmas presented to bioethics by religious pluralism, it nonetheless has 
its merits; namely, the fact that it takes empirical evidence of moral pluralism seriously, it 
avoids postulating universal moral claims, and it focuses on a methodology for forging 
commonly accepted norms rather than asserting such norms. 
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Pragmatism in Biomedical Ethics 
 
While some commentators such as John Arras would argue that pragmatism is not 
entirely new to the field of bioethics for it held an influential presence in bioethics’ 
formative years (Arras 2001), there has been a recent resurgence in attempting to employ 
pragmatic thinking as a means of combating the universalism and principalism which 
came to dominate the field in the 1980s through the 1990s, and which still holds a 
formidable presence.   
Drawing heavily upon the classical American philosophers, these bioethicists 
have attempted to employ pragmatist style problem solving in the clinic and as a means 
of solving the problems pluralism presents to an applied field of moral inquiry. Although 
the contemporary pragmatists in the biomedical-ethical circles have put forth theories as 
diverse as their pragmatist forefathers, that which unites this camp of bioethicists is their 
concern with usefulness, consensus and the employment of the scientific method for 
testing claims, their avoidance of universal truth-claims, and their promotion of 
democratic dialogue.  
Now, there are those who may be labeled ‘neo-pragmatists’ who have also 
recently joined the bioethical discourse, and also those who have been referred to as 
“freestanding pragmatists,” whose influence has been felt more heavily in political theory 
as opposed to bioethics. However, our concern at the present moment shall be with those 
more ‘classical’ pragmatists, so to speak, insofar as they have had a greater presence in 
bioethical discourse since the turn of the millennium. The two groups of this more 
‘classical’ camp of pragmatists are those, such as Glen McGee and Jonathan Moreno 
whose concern is more theoretical, dealing with principles and analyzing the state of 
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bioethics in general, and those such as Matthew Bacchetta and Joseph Fins whose 
concerns are case-based, addressing ways of bringing about resolution to moral dilemmas 
in particular instances of moral conflict in clinical settings.  The former have been 
referred to as pragmatic bioethicists, while the latter have referred to themselves as 
clinical pragmatists.  Despite this distinction, they possess enough in common for us to 
view them as representing a single movement within contemporary bioethics.         
Like the contract theorists, the Pragmatists recognize the importance of moral 
diversity, are concerned with the role of consensus and methods for achieving it and, as 
their name suggests, are concerned primarily with the usefulness of theories, methods, 
and principles as opposed to their ability to produce or discover absolute truthfulness.  
Joseph Fins remarks, “As Pragmatists, we are content to seek workable, satisfactory 
resolutions of pressing moral difficulties without any assurance or guarantee of getting it 
right” (Fins et al 1998, 40).  Like both the social scientists and contractualists the 
pragmatists oppose the postulation of universal principles; however “pragmatists do not 
entirely eschew principles…principles are taken to have functional, not fundamental 
value in helping to shape inquiry as it progresses” (Hester 2003, 554). In addition, like 
the contract theorists, what they offer is a methodology for creating norms rather than 
positing either a set of norms or an absolute basis upon which moral norms should be 
grounded.    
However, where the pragmatists differ greatly from the contract theorists is that: 
1) the conception of self they posit, if posited at all, is communal rather than monadic; 2) 
and they take the lived experience of those who will be affected by the bioethical 
enterprise as their starting point.  Rather than beginning with theoretical abstractions they 
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pay a degree of homage to the proposals of the social scientists by attempting to 
understand the contexts and circumstances of those involved in and affected by the 
ethical decision-making process.  Whereas the contract theorists do not take the time to 
comprehend the doctrines and contexts of the other, promoting a contextual 
understanding of circumstances, as well as doctrines, is a driving force of the pragmatist 
agenda.  
Though some, such as Micah Hester, propose a communal conception of human 
persons, they refrain from positing a detailed account of human nature. Hence, it is 
dialogue rather than any conception of the self which is to serve as the basis of producing 
bioethical decisions; this allows the pragmatists to avoid metaphysics at all costs. In this 
sense, they present a functionalist camp of bioethical inquiry. “Pragmatists eschew 
metaphysical, extra-experiential “objects”, but they do not deny objectivity…objectivity 
is taken in an operative, not ontological, sense” (Hester 2003, 550).  For the pragmatist 
meaning and truth are seen as objectively real yet contextually situated in that they are 
part of the experiential reality of those involved in unique situations, and operate to 
produce real effects upon individuals.   
Moreover, being pragmatists, they hold a concern with habits, viewing them as 
norm producing features of selves, their contexts, and their communities.  When 
conjoined with purpose and intelligent foresight, habits can help produce outcomes which 
are useful for addressing current concerns and can potentially create principles which can 
help guide future actions without dictating absolutely what ought to be done. Rather than 
beginning with abstract theoretical assumptions the pragmatist beings with the lived 
experiences of the patient and clinician involved in the conflict.     
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Further, they do not employ means of achieving consensus which are grounded in 
self-interested deliberative rationality, as the contract theorists do.  Rather, they recognize 
that entire worldviews are at stake in bioethical dilemmas, and hence they promote 
contextual understanding, attempting to avoid the legalistic bargaining and negotiation of 
the contract theories. Elizabeth Cooke – referring to Jonathan D. Moreno, a Senior 
Fellow at the Center for American Progress and Professor of Medical Ethics, History and 
Sociology of Science at the University of Pennsylvania -- writes, “Moreno makes an 
important distinction between agreement achieved through compromise versus agreement 
achieved through consensus, where a transformation in understanding takes place for the 
members (Moreno, 1995, pp.45-53)” (Cooke 2003, 649).   
Now, to fully understand Moreno’s distinction, one must realize that the 
pragmatist’s view of consensus looks very different from that of the contract theorist 
insofar as it is understood as an ongoing process. Together with an understanding of 
meaning and truth as contextual and a conception of the individual as communal, 
consensus itself requires a continued and revisable dialogue constantly in production of 
fallible results. “[C]onsensus understood pragmatically is not a thing to be achieved; it is, 
instead, a continuum of process-and-outcome know as intelligent inquiry itself” (Hester 
2003, 551) and hence, “consensus is not something sought, it is something produced” 
(Hester 2003, 555).  What the pragmatists ask of those involved in the dialogue is that 
they be open to a transformation in their own perspective as to produce an actual 
agreement with their interlocutor rather than a bargained compromise. “[C]linical 
pragmatism operates through a shared process of investigation, planning, decision-
making, and action in which all the stakeholders concerned with the moral problem 
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collaborate to create an ethically appropriate consensus” (Fins 1998, 69).  “These 
methods are thereby democratic and dialectical, and aim to secure agreements among all 
appropriate stake-holders, as ‘operative, but contingent, conclusions that must be 
validated through experience’ (Fins et al., 1999, p.32)” (Bellantoni 2003, 617). 
Much like the scientific method, the method involved in pragmatic moral inquiry 
is reliant upon the notions of experiment, fallibility, and falsifiability, in addition to 
discursive and democratic means.   First, there is an initial data collecting phase in which 
the facts of the situation are ascertained.  These include understanding the medical and 
diagnostic facts; the contextual facts of the parties involved, including societal cultural 
and familial circumstances and dynamics; and the moral dilemma at hand, including the 
potential solutions proposed by the different parties.  Second, there is a stage of inquiry 
and testing, in which moral solutions are tested against past outcomes and future aims of 
the parties involved.  This involves discussion, in which one may indeed change one’s 
point of view, that will produce a mutually agreed upon conclusion which may be revised 
in that it holds no absolute authority or universalistic privilege. 
The methodological suggestions proposed by the bioethical and clinical 
pragmatists appear to be approaching some sort of middle ground between principalistic 
universalism and particularism, by retaining the use of principles while simultaneously 
recognizing, and supporting a comprehension of, context.  
In addition, this method engages the problematic issue of incorporating a variety 
of religious voices into bioethical discourse by attempting to place everyone on an equal 
ground, and encouraging dialogue over debate.  Moreover, the proposal of flexible 
principles meant to serve as guiding norms for particular cases as opposed to infallible 
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universals does appear to resolve some of the tensions between respecting religious 
pluralism while maintaining something that resembles a normative enterprise.  
However, when one is addressing the issue of inter-faith and religio-secular 
dialogue in bioethics, there appear to be a number of problems with this position.  First, 
while the inclusiveness of this method is laudable despite the pragmatists’ avoidance of 
metaphysics and ontology, the fact that individuals are in fact faced with metaphysical 
and ontological dilemmas when presented with bioethical issues seems to be inescapable. 
Although metaphysical and ontological concerns may appear to be pragmatically useless, 
questioning such issues as the constituents of personhood, that which demarcates death 
and defining life will continue to be ultimate concerns of both the religious and secular 
members of society when faced with ethical dilemmas in medicine. The case of brain 
death discussed in the introduction, or any case of brain death for that matter, illustrates 
how metaphysical and ontological issues are evident in particular cases of biomedical 
ethical dilemmas, and how such concerns come to bear upon policy and the overarching 
theoretical dimensions of bioethical inquiry more generally. 
Second, despite the pragmatist’s openness to context and situation, it appears as if 
the parties involved are almost required to undergo an alteration in their moral paradigms, 
which would be a rather unrealistic criterion of any dialogical and multivocal 
methodology yet which may easily find its way into the implementation of the pragmatic 
method. Although it is also unrealistic to think that every party involved can have their 
way without concession or compromise, it seems too idealistic and hopeful to build the 
notion of an alteration of moral paradigms into the very structure of the methodology 
itself, however congenial this might be to pluralism and to resolving the issues at hand.  
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At first glance it appears that asking individuals to come to an understanding of the 
contexts of others is necessary. However, positing paradigmatic transformation begotten 
through dialogue does not necessarily need to be part of the fabric of a bioethical 
methodology for it to be respectful of pluralism. Also, alterations in worldviews do not 
seem necessary for bioethical theory to be conducive to responding to the variety of 
beliefs arising from a religiously pluralistic populous.  
Third, it might be argued that the pragmatists’ ethical and procedural proposals 
are overly reliant upon scientific methodology and consequently are laden with the values 
inherent in such a paradigm.  At least some appear to neglect the insights of 
contemporary philosophers of science, such as Thomas Kuhn13, who have exposed the 
value-laden and metaphysically driven nature of the so-called ‘value free,’ ‘culturally 
neutral,’ and ‘objective’ perspectives of scientific paradigms.  Hence, to treat the ethical 
dilemmas which arise in the biomedical sciences with methodological prescriptions that 
stem from such sciences themselves may not be the best means of embracing the 
paradigmatic pluralism which is presented to us by a religiously, culturally, and morally 
diverse population.      
To illustrate this point, take Fox’s discussion of a case presented in works of 
writer Anne Fadiman and psychiatrist and medical anthropologist Arthur Kleinmann.   A 
severely ill Hmong girl enters into a clinic. Her illness is believed by her parents to be the 
result of ‘soul loss’ caused by a malicious spirit, and they wish to treat her with 
traditional herbs and ceremonial rituals.  Conversely, the doctors have diagnosed her with 
epilepsy and want to administer pharmacotherapy following standard procedure.  Now, 
the issue at hand is not whether the girl is actually an epileptic or possessed by a demonic 
                                                 
13 For a more in depth analysis of these issues see Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions.  
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spirit, or both.  Rather the issue which Kleinmann raises, and which both Fox and 
Fadimann have duly noted, is that the physicians are oblivious to their own immersion in 
a culture, namely, the culture of their profession. Kleinmann observes that, “‘As powerful 
an influence as the culture of the Hmong patient and her family is on this case, the culture 
of biomedicine is equally powerful.  If you can’t see that your own culture has its own set 
of interests, emotions, and biases, how can you expect to deal successfully with someone 
else’s culture?”’ (Fox 2005, 1316).  
Just as the doctor in Kleinmann’s case overlooked his own biomedical culture, 
those implementing the pragmatic method in medical contexts may easily overlook the 
fact that this method draws upon and adopts concepts stemming from the scientific 
culture or context.  This could lead to a situation in which the bioethicists who are 
attempting to respect pluralism by understanding the contexts of others fail to take their 
own contexts into consideration, which may hamper their ability to ameliorate the 
tensions that they are attempting to quell.  The pragmatists’ confidence in employing 
scientific concepts in ethics may lead to the decontextualization of such concepts in 
actual clinical situations and, hence, may result in a situation in which the mindset of the 
ethicist resembles that of the doctor in Kleinmann’s case study.  If, as Kleinmann notes, 
we cannot expect such a clinician to successfully deal with another’s culture, how can we 
expect such an ethicist to be able to adequately deal with the ethical problems associated 
with pluralism?  Patients coming from a religious context may perceive the pragmatists’ 
employment of scientific notions as an instance of science dominating ethics and may 
have their reservations about such a method due to a potential fear of the possibility of 
the marginalization of their own paradigm.  If a patient’s religious beliefs prevent that 
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patient from accepting the terms of the dialogue, how can we expect that patient to take 
part in the dialogue and hence be a part of the process of ethical deliberation?  Hence, 
given such potential problems, utilizing concepts which are a product of the scientific 
paradigm might not be the most effective means of facilitating a constructive dialogue 
between religious and scientific perspectives. 
Furthermore, in the case just presented, not only do we discover that different 
paradigms of thought come to influence the perspectives of interlocutors coming into 
moral conflict with one another and that all such paradigms must be recognized as 
coming to bear upon the situations at hand, we also see that metaphysical and ontological 
concerns keep cropping up and are hardly as avoidable a feature of bioethical inquiry as 
the clinical and bioethical pragmatists would like them to be.  We may not want to have 
metaphysical or ontological discussions per se, however, issues of this sort continue to 
emerge in medical contexts and continue to create ethical problems that may not be 
adequately resolved unless we are willing to address the issues which themselves served 
as a catalyst to the problem.  In other words, rather than avoiding metaphysics all 
together, we must ask ourselves if we can engage metaphysical issues without falling into 
metaphysical discussions. By eschewing metaphysics pragmatists overlook issues that are 
at times integral elements of biomedical ethical problems. Thus, the pragmatists’ partial 
reliance upon the conceptual framework of the scientific paradigm in ethical decision-
making and their desire to refrain from raising metaphysical issues in the discussions they 
wish to hold may be a hindrance upon their methodology’s ability to adequately come to 
terms with the unique problems and divergent paradigms that are present in bioethical 
dilemmas involving religious and moral diversity and disagreement.               
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Chapter 3 
Pragmatic Perspectivism: 
A New Direction for Bioethical Methodology 
 
Now, that we have come to recognize both the need for ethnographic and 
descriptive work, and the need for methodology, there are a few questions which our 
critical analysis of the prior methodologies raises.  How can we avoid the potential 
myopia and absolutism of principalistic universalism?  How can we supplement the 
insufficient normativity of the descriptive work of ethnographers while acknowledging 
their concerns? How can we make room for explicitly religious perspectives in bioethical 
inquiry without having to accept such presuppositions as truths?  How can we avoid the 
rationalistic and legalistic pitfalls of the contractarians while still maintaining some 
limitations as to whom precisely takes part in the discussion?  And how can we refrain 
from the over-reliance on quasi-scientific methodologies and the ideal of a 
metaphysically neutral discussion purported by the pragmatists?  Ultimately, how can we 
achieve such methodological amendments while still maintaining something that 
resembles a normative project that will allow bioethics to find that middle ground 
between universalism and particularism?  In this chapter I will put forth a methodological 
model which attempts to achieve this goal.  Attempting to retain the benefits of the 
aforementioned theories I will suggest a new direction for bioethical methodology and a 
new conceptual framework that is meant to serve as a platform for creating a more 
pluralistic bioethics.   
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Forging a New Conceptual Framework for a Pluralistic Bioethics 
 
Having explored a few attempts to reconcile universalism with particularism, we 
have discovered that tensions still exist and there are many problematic features of these 
prior attempts at forging a pluralistic bioethics.  Although we pin-pointed a number of 
flaws with the methods of the bioethical and clinical pragmatists, the modest neo-
pragmatism of Jeffrey Stout may speak to these problems and be of assistance in the 
creation of a pluralistic bioethics.  Hence, while I will not be employing his theory as the 
ultimate solution to the problem of religio-cultural pluralism in bioethics, I would like to 
introduce some aspects of Stout’s theorizing, demonstrate their ability to assist in our 
endeavor, and, subsequently, apply them to the task at hand.   
What we have discovered in our discussion of religious pluralism in bioethics thus 
far is that it entails attempting to resolve and respect differences amongst a great deal of 
divergent moral, metaphysical, and ontological perspectives while questing for some 
common ground and shared guidelines for ethical theorizing in the biomedical sciences.  
Thus, in addition to our adoption of some of Stout’s modest pragmatic conceptual 
innovations, I would also like to introduce, adopt, and adapt some of the theoretical 
insights of Jose Ortega y Gasset’s perspectivism.  
Discovering conceptual commonalities between the works of Stout and Ortega, it 
will be demonstrated how a synthesis of the insights of their respective theories, when 
coupled together with the benefits of the aforementioned theories, may be employed in 
the creation of a pluralistic bioethics. Thus, after a précis and brief analysis of Stout and 
Ortega’s respective positions I will put forth a methodology that will be referred to as 
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“Pragmatic Perspectivism.”  The proposed methodology is meant to serve as a viable 
means of adequately addressing the problem of religious pluralism in bioethics.  
 
Stout 
Jeffrey Stout attempts to demonstrate how it is possible to accept the phenomenon 
of moral diversity without abandoning the idea that “moral truth” and “justified moral 
belief” exist.    He argues that moral diversity need not necessary compel us to adopt 
skeptical or nihilistic positions in ethics.  Stout brings our attention to the fact that when 
evaluating the truth value of a given proposition one must appeal to a set of other 
propositions not currently under scrutiny.  He argues that to test the verity of a moral 
proposition X one does not appeal directly to the moral law itself, but rather to a set of 
beliefs one holds about the moral law, regardless of whether or not the moral law actually 
does or does not exist.  Hence, there are a number of other non-moral beliefs which are 
presupposed when evaluating the truth value of a given moral proposition (Stout 2001, 
23).  Subsequently, “What you can’t do, if you are human, is have your judgment 
determined solely by the matter under consideration without relying on beliefs, habits of 
description, and patterns of reasoning that belong to a cultural inheritance” (Stout 2001, 
23).   
Consequently, this leads Stout to draw a distinction between justification and 
truth.  He asks us to recognize that, despite the fact that to hold a belief entails accepting 
the truth of that belief, one could be simultaneously wrong and justified in holding the 
belief.   Avoiding a definition of truth per se, Stout claims that the truth-value of a 
proposition is a property of that proposition.  Conversely, justification, unlike truth, is 
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relational in nature; it entails a proper set of relations between a proposition, a person 
accepting said proposition, and the cognitive/epistemic context of the individual. Given 
the fact that in order to even test the verity of a proposition one is heavily reliant upon 
other beliefs not currently being scrutinized, justification becomes highly relative to 
epistemic circumstances while the actual truth of the proposition is not. “Justification in 
morality, as in science, is relative—but relative to one’s epistemic circumstance, 
including reasons and evidence available at the current stage of inquiry, not to the 
arbitrary choice of individuals” (Stout 2001, 29-30).  However, “This relativity does not 
carry over…to truth.  What we’re justified in believing…varies according to the evidence 
and reasoning available to us in our place in culture and history. But the truth of the 
proposition…doesn’t vary in the same way” (Stout 2001, 30). Therefore, if the 
relationship between the proposition, the individual, and one’s epistemic circumstances 
exist in the proper way, the assertion that this proposition is true can be justified despite 
the falsity of the proposition, or even unjustified despite its truthfulness.  
For example, Stout claims that if an individual lives in an era in which slavery is 
both commonly accepted and not considered to be immoral and consequently that 
individual believes that slavery is a morally permissible institution then that person’s 
belief may indeed be wrong yet the individual may be justified in holding this belief.  
Given the individual’s own experiences, the consensus of the era and the fact that the 
individual has acquired the best possible knowledge afforded to her at the time, this 
person may be justified in holding this belief even if the belief that slavery is morally 
permissible is indeed false (Stout 2001, 29).    
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Insofar as epistemic circumstances may indeed change over time, Stout requests 
that we be humble. At a future time, either through familiarity with other epistemic 
contexts or due to new evidence, or a greater understanding of various phenomena, we 
may no longer be justified in asserting those propositions which we currently assert and 
may in fact alter that which we currently take to be true.  
Subsequently, his theory encourages us to engage in dialogue with others, 
simultaneously recognizing that a change in our epistemic circumstances can lead to the 
acceptance of different truth-claims.  In this way it views consensus in terms of an on-
going dialogical process and presents us with a discursive methodology for normative 
ethical inquiry.  Such a discursive mode of ethical inquiry is able to incorporate a 
plurality of moral perspectives into the process of creating ethical guidelines, or 
standards.  Hence, it may be able to assist in the resolution of some of the difficulties 
which have been presented to us when attempting to deal with religious pluralism in 
bioethics.  
Recognizing that it is justification and not truth which is relative to time, place, 
and culture, we are presented with a panoply of new options when analyzing moral 
disagreements, for we can come to recognize that an individual is justified in asserting a 
claim without having to resort to either an acceptance of the truth of his claim or the 
verity of beliefs constitutive of his epistemic context.  What Stout has presented us with 
is not only a novel approach to confront moral diversity and a way of reconciling 
relativism with absolute truth, but also a means of respecting the claims of others without 
necessarily having to abandon our own conceptions of what the moral truth is.  
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To elaborate, if proposition A is justified in relation to person P1 and epistemic 
context E1, it is not only possible, but likely – given that justification is primarily 
contingent upon epistemic contexts – that A could remain justified when asserted by P2 
in E1.  However, it also seems possible that a situation could arise in which A is not only 
justified in relation to either P1 in E1 or P2 in E1, but could also be justified in relation to 
P2 in E2.  Although distinct, the beliefs which constitute an epistemic context could be 
such that they may be used to justify a given proposition A, regardless of their 
compatibility with the beliefs of another epistemic context or their ability to justify other 
propositions which may be justifiable in different epistemic contexts.   
Take for example the religious perspectives of a Buddhist and Christian in regards 
to brain death. While these individuals will approach this bioethical issue from different 
epistemic paradigms, they may in fact be able to justify the same propositions.   As a 
means of illustrating the mere possibility of such a scenario, I will put forth a brief 
comparison of Damien Keown, a Buddhist scholar, and Jason Eberl, a Thomistic Catholic 
philosopher.   
Writing from a Theravada Buddhist perspective, Keown claims that “Buddhism 
sees the human individual as constituted by their organic wholeness rather than by their 
personhood” (Keown 2001, 141-142).  Employing the notion of “prana”, which means 
“breath” and which is translated as “vital breath” or “life”, Keown demonstrates how 
justifiability of “whole brain” death is indigenous to Theravada Buddhism itself and that 
secular arguments, external to the tradition, need not be utilized as a means of discussing 
this bioethical issue. Keown writes, “The basic meaning of prana is ‘breath' and by 
extension ‘life’…By prana on understands ‘vital breath’, a wind on whose existence the 
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body and mind depend” (Keown 2001 149-150).  Drawing a correlation between ‘prana’ 
and an ultimate concern with psychophysical wholeness, Keown endorses ‘whole brain’ 
death from within the context of a uniquely Buddhist paradigm of thought without 
altering any traditional metaphysical, moral, or epistemological beliefs.  Keown’s 
position proceeds as follows: 
The significance of brainstem death is not the loss of consciousness but 
the loss of the brain’s capacity to co-ordinate the organic functioning of 
the body….The test for this condition of disintegration is the death of the 
brainstem, but it must be remembered that what is being declared under 
this condition is the death of the human being. It does not follow from the 
use of this test that a human being is regarded as in any sense identical 
with or reducible to their brain, much less cognitive functions. (Keown 
2001, 155)   
 
Conversely, writing from a Catholic perspective, the Thomist philosopher Jason 
Eberl also endorses the whole-brain criterion of determining death.  Eberl grounds his 
argument on notions of unity and a concern for the organism as a whole. Like Keown, 
Eberl stays within the parameters of his own tradition (the Thomistic Christian tradition) 
in forging an adequate response to brain death.  Eberl states:  
The whole-brain criterion of death has its roots in an understanding of death 
being related to an organism as a whole.…In Thomistic terms, when integrative 
unity has been irreversibly lost, a body is no longer proportionate for rational 
ensoulment.…Therefore, the cessation of both a brain’s rationally-correlated and 
biologically-integrative functioning indicates a rational soul’s departure as a 
particular human body’s substantial form. (Eberl 2005, 42-43)   
 
However, although similar notions of the wholeness of the organism appear in 
both authors’ respective arguments, the ways in which they arrive at such a concept are 
not only distinct but stand in opposition to one another.  As a Thomist, Eberl is highly 
concerned with rationality, believes in a formal soul which is distinct from the body and 
which controls a human’s physicality, and holds that such a rational soul operates through 
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a primary organ, which Eberl identifies as the brain. Eberl claims, “Aquinas understands 
a rational soul to be the principle of a human body’s organic functioning and to operate 
by means of a primary organ” (Eberl 2005, 31).   On the contrary, Keown’s argument 
holds no such concerns. From Keown’s Theravada Buddhist perspective a human being 
is not conceptualized in terms of rationalistic personhood or metaphysical essentialism, as 
Eberl’s appears to be.  Consequently, given his position it seems that Keown would most 
likely deny of the existence of a “primary organ” and a metaphysical “essence” of the 
human individual. Claiming that  “[Western]… definitions of ‘personhood’ take the 
rational human adult as their paradigm” (Keown 2001, 27-18),  Keown argues, “The 
Buddhist denial of a self means that no one factor from the total physical and 
psychological complex can be singled out as more or less ‘essential’” (Keown 2001, 30).  
Keown goes on to argue:    
The criteria supplied by our texts [i.e. Buddhist texts], such as vitality and 
heat, are clearly of an organic as opposed to an intellectual nature. Death 
is not depicted as the loss of intellectual functions but the biological end of 
an organism. (Keown 2001, 154)      
 
The proposition that “‘whole brain’ death is an acceptable means of determining 
the death of a human individual” has been justified by both Buddhist and Christian 
thinkers despite the fact that each is engaging the issue through the lens of distinct 
epistemic contexts.  Yet, although these epistemic contexts may differ, and at times might 
conflict with one another, it has been demonstrated that there is a possibility that 
conceptual similarities and similar values may be present in both paradigms of thought.  
These potential similarities may be useful in promoting dialogue even if these thinkers, 
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holding seemingly irresolvable conceptual differences, had disagreed on the positions of 
‘whole-brain death’.  
Therefore, although two epistemic contexts may differ to the extent that they are 
able to justify conflicting propositions, it does not necessarily follow that the two 
epistemic contexts will never be able to justify the same proposition.  In this way 
members of a given religio-moral tradition who maintain a belief in the existence of 
absolute truth -- even going so far as asserting the universal truth of their own 
propositions and the universality of their own paradigms of belief -- may be able to 
simultaneously acknowledge the justifiability of particular propositions across epistemic 
contexts.   
Person X from tradition X may perceive person Y from tradition Y as holding a 
false system of beliefs, however, X can acknowledge the truth of Y’s proposition V 
despite the fact that his/her reasons for asserting V are distinct.  If both parties are 
justified in their assertion of V, then we may begin to find a common set of guidelines, 
not by employing a mode of reasoning foreign to both parties, but rather by discovering 
conceptual links between their respective perspectives – all the while avoiding communal 
attempts to discover the nature of absolute truth.  The point is that, even if we agree with 
Stout that justification is relative to epistemic contexts, there is no reason to reject the 
notion that different epistemic contexts are capable of justifying the same propositions. 
Consequently, there does not appear to be a prima facie reason to require an alteration of 
one’s epistemic context from the outset. 
Stout brings to our attention the notion that dialogue with others is able to produce 
a change in our epistemic circumstances, which in turn can lead to the justifiability of a 
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moral proposition which was previously unjustifiable in our prior epistemic context. “We 
might, after all our dialogue with the dead or the foreign, decide to change our minds on 
the moral issue in question” (Stout 2001, 32). While I do not wish to refute this claim, I 
do wish to call attention to two important points. First, there are a number of individuals 
and groups who do believe themselves to be in possession of absolute truths, and who 
may be the least likely to display the humility, and willingness to change, that Stout 
requests.  However, this reluctance to change need not imply that their positions be 
unrepresented in bioethics.  In addition, I would like to note that an unwillingness to 
change should not necessarily be equated with a lack of openness to dialogue.  Second, 
this notion of change has great potential to be misused and construed as a requirement of 
our methodology.  Discussing the prospects of a common morality, Stout states, “One 
thing we will want to know is the extent to which the moral vocabularies and patterns of 
reasoning employed by the two groups resemble or can be made to resemble one another” 
(Stout 2004, 226).  Now, I emphasize “made to resemble” for if coupled with the notion 
of change the idea of making-to-resemble may be used to implement a requirement of 
epistemic alteration at the outset of our discursive process. Such a requirement could 
preclude an authentic respect for the other’s perspective as it exists in and of itself and 
may result in an attitude in which the other’s perspective is only respected insofar as one 
believes that it can be molded to fit one’s own conceptual paradigm. Subsequently, such 
an attitude may perpetuate a belief that the other’s perspective must be transformed in 
order to be conducive with one’s own mode of moral reasoning, which as we have seen is 
not necessarily the case.      
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A related potential danger, which I also wish to avoid, is that Stout’s theory may 
be interpreted in such a manner as to imply that distinct epistemic contexts always justify 
different sorts of propositions.  In accord with Stout’s own denial of such an 
interpretation I would like to illustrate why it need not ensue. What would follow from 
this interpretation is the claim that it is only through alterations of various epistemic 
contexts that we can attain an adequate means of reconciliation amongst various moral 
perspectives and can begin to forge commonly accepted bioethical principles. Again, we 
would be presented with a potential argument for the necessity of change as a 
methodological requirement.  However, as demonstrated by the previous dialogue 
between Eberl and Keown, this need not be the case.  Neither of the aforementioned 
interlocutors altered either their epistemic contexts or their ethical positions, yet they are 
still able to arrive at consensus through dialogue.  Rather than amending their 
perspectives in order to arrive at a conceptual common ground we are presented with a 
bridging of two distinct epistemic contexts in such a way that preserves their 
distinctiveness yet simultaneously leads to agreement.  Our task is not to endorse 
transformations aimed at producing an amalgamation of perspectives but rather is to 
forge conceptual bridges between unique moral perspectives.    
Now, while I have drawn largely upon Stout’s work, the conceptual framework I 
wish to propose will diverge slightly from Stout’s theorizing.  First, while aligned with a 
number of Stout’s claims, I would like to refrain from a complete adherence to Stout’s 
position regarding metaphysics.  Second, I will refrain from adopting Stout’s views 
regarding the status of the individual in a dialogical ethical process.  Seeking means of 
conducting ethical discourse regardless of one’s religious beliefs, Stout, like other 
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pragmatists, wishes to avoid any discussions of a metaphysical nature.  He wishes to 
sustain the assertion of truth claims by interlocutors engaged in ethical discourse, yet he 
believes, “You can have the concept of moral truth and an ethos of fallibility and self-
criticism…without adopting a theory that makes moral facts or “the moral law” capable 
of explaining what it is for true moral propositions to be true” (Stout, 253-254, 2004).  
Stout states, “Truth-talk is not an implicitly metaphysical affair, standing in need of 
metaphysical articulation and defense” (Stout 255, 2004).  Stout is not attempting to 
debunk the metaphysical beliefs of ordinary religious persons but rather proposes that 
ethical dialogue does not depend upon a shared religious faith or a common metaphysics.  
He wants to promote constructive ethical dialogue despite metaphysical disagreement and 
does so by leaving metaphysics out of the discussion.  
However, although the purpose of our conceptual framework is not to solve 
metaphysical problems and while it should not be construed as a forum for metaphysical 
debate per se, metaphysical considerations are often of primary concern in bioethical 
discussions and debates.  In alignment with Stout, we must maintain that constructive 
bioethical discourse need not be contingent upon a shared metaphysics, however.  Unlike 
other realms of applied ethics, not only do metaphysical beliefs commonly serve as the 
foundations for moral deliberation but are often directly placed under scrutiny in 
biomedical ethical contexts.  For example, debates over brain death often entail 
deliberations and beliefs regarding the nature of death and human personhood.  These 
debates raise issues that are not only contingent upon metaphysics but are themselves 
metaphysical. Moving toward a pluralistic bioethics may warrant a circumvention of such 
explicitly metaphysical debates, however, it seems that any fruitful dialogue will be 
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difficult to achieve if the very concerns that prompted the debate in the first place are left 
out of the discussion.  Hence, all I ask is that we be careful not to overlook the 
metaphysical component of interlocutor’s epistemic contexts and keep in mind that 
bioethical decisions may at times threaten metaphysical beliefs.  Thus, I request that we 
engage metaphysical beliefs in our dialogues yet do so in such a way as to avoid actual 
metaphysical debates regarding the nature of reality or absolute truth.  In other words, 
interlocutors should be able to lay their metaphysical cards on the table, so to speak, 
without the aim of our dialogical process becoming a resolution of metaphysical 
problems.  We have to be able to talk about metaphysical beliefs without engaging in 
metaphysical discussions per se.   
Moreover, Stout’s theory tends to favor individualism, which may hamper its 
ability to adequately address religio-cultural pluralism.  Stout writes:  
Ideally, it [a democratic ethical community] also invites its members to 
resist their own absorption into the social mass and to cultivate whatever 
virtues are required to foster the development of novel forms of action, 
speech, association, and selfhood.  Whitman calls this the “principle of 
individuality.” A self-consciously democratic ethical community is aware 
of itself as a community of individuals: each of whom has evaluating to do 
that no one else can do on his or her behalf…. (Stout 2004, 282).    
 
Now, Stout’s concerns are well taken, for he does not wish to see his theory collapse into 
an authoritarian mob rule scenario, yet, we must be wary of the implications of requiring 
something like a “principle of individuality.”  We must refrain from postulating such a 
principle and from over-emphasizing the importance of individuality as not to dismiss 
those religious voices whose traditions may not place any significant value upon 
individuality.  
   
  51
Regarding the status of the ‘universal’ bioethical principle of “autonomy”, what 
would it look like if we were to include Stout’s individualism into our framework? Given 
the claims put forth by Confucian bioethicist Ruiping Fan, I would like to note that a 
Confucian family may not even employ concepts such as “autonomy” and 
“individualism” in their ethical deliberations (Fan 2000).  Consequently, a breach of 
“autonomy” would not be an especially important moral concern of this Confucian 
family.  Now, would this mean that Confucians will have no part in the bioethical 
dialogue?  I think not.  Requiring that individuality be incorporated into our conceptual 
framework could potentially create an inherent predisposition towards individualism in 
the method itself and would result in an unfair bias towards conceptualizing all of the 
guidelines, which we are seeking to create anew, in highly individualistic and possibly 
ethno-centric terms. 
Regardless of whether or not a individual Confucian’s paradigm will or may 
undergo conceptual changes and despite the notion that epistemic alterations may be 
inevitable at some future point in time, as stated previously, such changes need not be 
thought of as necessary pre-requisites for consensus.  We should not be waiting for, nor 
expecting changes or revisions in the metaphysical beliefs of epistemic contexts in order 
for consensus to be construed as an achievable goal.  Hence, the applicability of our 
methodology must not be contingent upon one’s acceptance of individualism begotten 
through a change in epistemic circumstance or metaphysical paradigm, which is 
essentially what requiring a principle of individuality entails.  As purported by Ruiping 
Fan, community, not individuality, is the metaphysically significant concept in the 
Confucian paradigm and is the primary thread in the Confucian’s moral fabric (Fan 
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2004). Hence, if it is to be a truly pluralistic method, our conceptual framework must 
come to respect this value-system as it is and not as we think it ought to be.  Therefore, 
individualism should not be given a privileged role in the inherent structure of our 
method.  Nevertheless, our inhibitions about requiring a principle of individuality, our 
avoidance of emphasizing scientific methodology and our reservations about requesting 
changes in the metaphysical paradigms of religious believers need not occlude our 
employment of Stout’s theory of justification nor should they be construed as a call to 
entirely exclude scientific and individualistic modes of reasoning.  Rather, such 
inhibitions are merely meant to serve as preventative measures aimed at securing an 
adequate degree of respect for distinct perspectives.     
Thus, by employing Stout’s pragmatic notion of justification, we can seek 
justificatory congruities amongst varying epistemic contexts. In this way no demand for 
change need be imposed upon conflicting epistemic contexts, especially when both 
maintain absolute truth claims and an authoritative position in regards to their own 
unique systems of belief.  Consequently, it will be demonstrated how, when coupled with 
an epistemologically ‘weak’ perspectivism, Stout’s notion of justificatory relativism may 
enable the creation of a method for discovering a moral consensus, that avoids imposing 
a single mode of reasoning, be it scientific or rationalistic, or a requirement of epistemic 
change on the parties involved and which simultaneously humbles itself in regards to 
moral claims of a universal and absolute sort. 
 
 
 
   
  53
Ortega 
Jose Ortega y Gasset has proposed a quasi-existential notion of self and reality 
and a correlative epistemology which is grounded in the perceptions, point of view, and 
the socio-historical context of the individual.  His most famous postulate is “Yo soy yo y 
mi circumstancias,” or “I am I and my circumstances,” which implies that the identity of 
an individual is comprised of one’s physicality and one’s situated-ness in time and place.  
According to Ortega, all one has as one’s individual reality is the socio-historical 
circumstances in which one has found oneself. Hence one can only make sense of oneself 
and reality through perception and inquiry which are constantly filtered through one’s 
own situational and contextual circumstances. Insofar as each individual’s perspective on 
reality is affected by the contextual and situational nature of the socio-historical world in 
which one exists and with which one interacts, one’s perspective is constitutive of one’s 
existential and experiential reality. Thus for Ortega, reality itself is the conglomerate of 
all of these individual instances of the real.  Now, I do not wish to go into great detail on 
this point, for it is his epistemological insights which are of primary concern to our study.  
However, it is from this ontology that his epistemological position, which has been 
dubbed “perspectivism”, emerges.   
 Ortegean perspectivism claims that truth is “perspectival”, by which Ortega 
means that truth is dependent upon the situational perception and contextual 
understanding of the individual. However, Ortega has argued that this is not a 
subjectivism insofar as he, like Stout, has postulated that an objective truth does indeed 
exist, albeit an absolute truth which is simultaneously inextricably bound to individuals 
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yet which cannot be reduced to a single individual perspective. Commenting on Ortega’s 
philosophy Victor Ouimette writes,  
[Ortega] recognized that for each man that which is the apparently the 
same is in fact different and that there are as many realities as there are 
points of view… and that each of these perspectives is an integral 
component of reality [taken as a whole]. (Ouimette 1982, 47-57) 
 
Providing a succinct summary of Ortega’s position Julian Marias writes, “Stated more 
strictly: my reality is also reality; it is a part, or, better still, a constitutive ingredient of 
reality” (Marias 1970, 379 [italics in original text]).   
The aims of Ortega’s perspectivism are comparable to those of Stout’s 
pragmatism insofar as Ortega attempts to overcome both a relativistic skepticism, which 
reduces truth to the subjective or the circumstantial, and a rationalist universalism, which 
fails to incorporate the subject herself and her contextual circumstances.  Ortega states, 
“The individual point of view seems to me the only point of view from which one can 
look at the world in its truth…(II, 18)” (Ouimette 1982, 77). Consequently, the individual 
is inescapability bound to her circumstances.  Such a view echoes the claims of Stout’s 
modest pragmatism, and presents us with a conceptual parallel in the writings of the two 
authors. Stout claims: 
We begin already immersed in the assumptions and precedents of a 
tradition, whether religious or secular…Our starting point is not so much 
arbitrary as it is inescapable: we are who we are, the heirs of this tradition 
as opposed to that one, born into an epoch rather than another, our 
intuitions shaped by the grammar of our native tongue. (Stout 2001, 120)     
 
Like Ortega’s position, Stout’s position is not to be construed as a subjectivism 
either insofar as, for Stout, the justifiability of one’s perspective of truth is not dependent 
upon an individual’s arbitrary choices and imaginative ideals, but rather is a result of his 
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circumstances.  For a proposition to be justifiably asserted as true, its content must 
considered within and in regards to the concrete circumstances of a given context (Stout 
2001).   For Ortega “there is a structure of the real, which only presents itself 
perspectively, which needs to be integrated from multiple terms or points of view, and 
which demands exactness in our reaction” (Marias 1970, 375).  Now, while Ortega’s 
proposals are highly metaphysical and ontological in nature, and employing them as they 
stand could potentially entail an imposition of such beliefs and values upon others, it is 
possible to modify and weaken such claims, retaining those elements which may be 
useful when attempting to come to terms with the plurality of perspectives presented to us 
by cases of religio-cultural moral disagreement in bioethics. 
Drawing upon that which we have learned form our previous discussions of the 
social sciences, we can view such empirical data as describing social phenomena which 
are reflective of an unavoidable social reality.  In this vein, we can modify Ortega’s 
perspectivism, eliminating any references to a metaphysical and ontological structure of 
the real, and come to recognize the multiplicity of perspectives of which Ortega speaks as 
constitutive of a social reality as opposed to a metaphysical reality.  Where Ortega claims 
that it is where the various perspectives link up that we come closest to discovering 
absolute truth, when amended in this way we can claim that bioethical consensus and 
those ethical propositions which will be most likely to be considered acceptable to all of 
the parties involved will be found in the commonalities, and compatible elements, of 
already existing belief systems.   
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Now, where Ortega’s perspectivism seeks to discover and explain the nature of 
absolute truth, Stout’s pragmatism, while acknowledging the existence of absolute truth, 
avoids discussions of its contents and the nature of universals and what they would entail.  
I propose that, when applying Ortega’s idea of “perspectivism” to bioethics, we also 
avoid such discussions by weakening his epistemological claims and re-directing our 
inquiry as to focus upon the nature of socio-cultural reality rather than metaphysical truth 
or epistemological reality.   
Furthermore, we can avoid both the postulation of and the quest for any 
metaphysical truths without having to necessarily eliminate discussions of metaphysical 
beliefs.  By conceptualizing divergent metaphysical perspectives as constitutive of our 
social reality we can fully engage such perspectives without necessarily lapsing into 
metaphysical discussions per se if we maintain that practicality, and not metaphysics, is 
the driving force behind our inquiry.  Moreover, by recognizing metaphysical beliefs as 
partly constitutive of context and as partial foundations of epistemic circumstances, rather 
than as mere by-products of such circumstances, we can view metaphysical beliefs as 
integral elements of perspectives.  Hence, I suggest a comparative exploration of distinct 
perspectives which need not entail either an avoidance of or dismantling of the 
foundations of such perspectives nor a direct engagement in metaphysical debate.   
It is possible to explore conceptions of absolute truth and the ultimate nature of 
reality without having the discovery of either as the intended goals of our method.  Thus, 
we can promote understanding and avoid postulating any requirements for change and 
revision in regards to the metaphysical beliefs inherent within many religious paradigms 
and epistemic contexts while still moving toward consensus.  
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By focusing on the phenomenological reality of pluralism, we can search for 
commonalities amongst belief systems and ethical positions. What we can come to 
recognize as a socio-cultural and phenomenological truth is that there are different 
perspectives regarding moral truth, and that each of these perspective is held to be true by 
the individual who holds it. In this way our methodology would not view such 
commonalities as evidence of absolute perennial truths but rather as pointing to the seeds 
of consensus and the building blocks of a platform upon which shared norms and 
guidelines may be forged in a pluralistic manner.  Whereas Ortega holds that, given one’s 
circumstances, point of view, and experiential reality, his perspective is true, by 
importing Stout’s notion of justification we can amend this assertion by claiming that 
such a perspective is justified and that the landscape of our social reality is comprised of 
the presence of a multiplicity of such perspectives.   
Hence, we can promote respect and open the doors of dialogue in such a manner 
as to reduce the degree to which an imposition of our own values is being imparted upon 
others.  The synthesis and amendment of Stout and Ortega’s ideas just presented will be 
referred to as ‘pragmatic perspectivism.’  Subsequently, it will be demonstrated that when 
applied to bioethics this theory can serve as the foundation of a new conceptual 
framework and more pluralistic methodology for the creation of bioethical guidelines and 
norms.  
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Pragmatic Perspectivism in Theory 
 
Pragmatic Perspectivism, unlike other responses to religious pluralism, refrains 
from putting forth a conclusive moral system and, while it recognizes the need for shared 
moral guidelines in bioethics, it avoids any proposal to forge a universal morality.  Rather 
than positing a new form of “unbiased” moral reasoning or asserting a “universal” set of 
principles, pragmatic perspectivism provides a conceptual framework for bioethics which 
will enable the incorporation of varying modes of moral reasoning into the moral 
dialogue and the deliberative processes of bioethical inquiry.  Yet, unlike 
contractarianism, pragmatic perspectivism does not request that interlocutors bracket 
their values or religious beliefs. Hence, it does not endorse a rationalistic method of 
reasoning which may potentially prevent the parties involved from employing their own 
modes of moral reasoning. Rather it attempts to respect the modes of reasoning employed 
by individuals possessing diverse perspectives and distinct paradigms of thought.   
Pragmatic perspectivism views such divergent perspectives as part of the 
constitution of socio-cultural reality.  It recognizes the phenomenon that people hold such 
divergent beliefs as true without necessarily passing an epistemological judgment on the 
contents of such beliefs and correlative moral propositions.  Rather than endorsing a 
contractual agreement based upon a rationalistic methodology and bargaining, this 
method seeks propositions that are justifiable amongst distinct modes of reasoning. 
Consequently, it does not strive for any single objective point of view from which a 
common morality capable of transcending difference can be achieved. Rather, it seeks to 
promote discourse which is capable of discovering conceptual links already present 
amongst divergent perspectives that can aid in the creation of bioethical guidelines.  
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Begotten from a multi-perspectival source, the conclusions of the method have the 
potential to be more adequately representative of our multi-cultural and religiously 
pluralistic society.  
Pragmatic perspectivism is pragmatic in the sense that it emphasizes usefulness 
over truthfulness, seriously taking into consideration the applied aspect of the bioethical 
enterprise and the lived social realities of those whom it is applicable to.   Furthermore, 
this method aims at achieving consensus, yet recognizes that given our pluralistic social 
reality the process of arriving at such a consensus must be on-going and dialogical in 
nature.  However, unlike some pragmatist solutions it does not necessarily require or 
request an alteration or revision of the perspective which one holds to be true, for it is this 
unique perspective which a pragmatic perspectivist is attempting to understand, respect, 
and take into consideration.  Rather than valuing the revision of epistemic contexts in lieu 
of dialogue or asking others to alter their own perspectives, as do other forms of 
pragmatism, pragmatic perspectivism requests that interlocutors seek to locate 
commonality or compatibility amongst the various perspectives arising from distinct 
epistemic contexts.  Another distinction is that it refrains from equating science and 
ethics, as do other forms of pragmatism, for such a move presupposes that all moral 
reasoning resembles that of science.  While both science and this methodology itself do 
indeed strive for usefulness, and this method calls for a revision of the leading 
methodologies in bioethics, I am not willing to claim that science and morality per se 
have the same structure or teleology.  Hence, we must not presuppose that each 
interlocutor will hold a view of morality in which moral propositions are seen as being 
akin to scientific hypotheses. Thus we cannot assume that they will be as willing and 
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likely to scrutinize and revise their own personal moral beliefs, which they may indeed 
hold to be absolute and universal, in the same way that our overarching method views the 
ethical guidelines it seeks to produce.          
Moreover, in this way pragmatic perspectivism does not require that the people 
involved adopt a perspectival theory of truth nor is it claiming that those involved in the 
bioethical discourse must abandon their own moralities.  Rather, that which it is 
requesting is that everyone in the dialogue comes to realize that others may be justified in 
holding their views regardless of the actual truthfulness of those positions and to search 
for similar values and beliefs inherent in each other’s paradigms.   
Hence, even if one does in fact believe that holding his perspective is paramount 
to the possession of absolute truth, that individual may still come to recognize that there 
may indeed be some degree of truth, however minimal, to be found in the perspectives 
presented by others.  For example, if individual A believes that he possesses absolute 
truth in his perspective, what pragmatic perspectivism as a method requests is that A 
acknowledges that B may be justified in holding her “false” network of beliefs, and given 
that B is justified to accept that there may be ‘partial truths’ (regarding A’s overall 
network of beliefs and epistemic context) to be found within the perspective of B.  In 
other words, given A’s perspective and epistemic context, this methodology encourages 
A to be open to the idea that certain truths may be found in the paradigms of others 
despite A’s denial that B’s belief system as a whole is absolutely true.  
 It is important to recognize that pragmatic perspectivism does not deny that 
A’s epistemic circumstances may in fact change once A is engaged in dialogue with 
another, however, it refrains from requesting that such a change is necessary in 
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order for consensus to be achieved. This together with its non-reliance upon scientific 
methodology and non-privileging of individualism is where pragmatic perpsectivism 
differs most greatly from the various forms of pragmatism which have previously been 
employed as means of resolving the moral disagreements presented to us by religio-
cultural pluralism.   
Yet, one may ask, should every perspective be given equal weight and be taken 
into consideration when attempting to forge bioethical guidelines? Subsequently, this 
individual may criticize pragmatic perspectivism stating, “If so, this would seem to be a 
flaw of the methodology, for proceeding in such a manner would necessarily entail 
encountering certain irresolvable conflicts, especially insofar as pragmatic perspectivism 
refuses to require an alteration of perspectives and has postulated no universal truth to 
which we can appeal.”  In order to reply to such an objection, a pragmatic perspectivist 
must concur that the incorporation of every, and any, potential moral perspective may 
indeed lead to a chaotic and unproductive state.  However, part of the problem is that the 
criteria for eligibility in bioethical discourse have been highly exclusionary.  Thus, how 
do we determine which perspectives are eligible for the bioethical discourse in the first 
place?   
The contractarians have employed the Rawlsian distinction between reasonable 
and unreasonable comprehensive doctrines, with unreasonable comprehensive doctrines 
being those which attempt to impart their moral systems upon everyone. Yet, as I have 
argued, such a distinction seems to fail. Insofar as most religious traditions not only 
believe in absolute truth but believe themselves to be in possession of such a truth, it 
seems natural that such believers may attempt to convince others of the truth of their 
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beliefs. Now, this may be construed as an attempt to impart their particular moral system 
upon everyone, yet this need not be the case.  The contractarian standard does not 
adequately differentiate between attempting to convert someone or convince someone of 
the truth of one’s claims and imparting one’s views and beliefs upon others in an unjust 
and undue manner.  Basically, it creates a slippery slope toward excluding the 
perspectives of many religious individuals insofar as evangelizing is an integral part of 
many religious traditions.  Hence, while some standard needs to be employed, the 
contractarian standard of reasonability does not seem to be the best candidate. 
We may look toward Stout’s work when attempting to resolve this issue.  
Examining some of the ramifications of incorporating Stout’s notion of justification into 
our current methodology, I ask, what does the relativity of justification entail? Firstly, 
being able to claim that one is justified in one’s assertion of a given moral proposition 
necessarily entails an understanding of that individual’s epistemic context, for without 
such understanding judging the relationality of the proposition, person, and epistemic 
context would be impossible.  Hence, that which is a prerequisite for one to be considered 
a satisfactory and competent judge of justification is a degree of openness toward the 
perspective of the other and a comprehension of the complexities of a person’s epistemic 
circumstances.  Stout states, “Communities take shape only insofar as their members 
perform the work of mutual recognition…” (Stout 2004, 281).  Hence, if we see this 
group of interlocutors as representative of the larger community, then we can come to 
recognize how openness and mutual recognition must play an integral role in the process 
of creating principles which are supposed to serve as guidelines for the community as a 
whole.     
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Secondly, the ability to assert justification necessarily entails the ability to detect 
its absence.  Hence, the individual who is capable of being a judge of justification must 
be armed with the appropriate criteria for determining the unjustified status of certain 
moral propositional assertions without falling down the slippery slope of attempting to 
judge the universal truth-value of either those moral propositions being asserted or those 
propositions and beliefs which comprise the conceptual background necessary for the 
individual’s moral proposition to have been asserted as ‘true’ in the first place.  
Therefore, being a competent judge of justifiability will necessarily entail a minimization 
of one’s biases from the outset and a temporary adoption of, at least to the best of one’s 
ability, the mode of reasoning under examination.  This is unlike the contractarian 
solution, for the contractarian solution does not require that any knowledge of the actual 
perspective of the other be had.  Rather, it claims that any perspective which may be 
perceived as being unduly imparted upon others should be eliminated from the bargaining 
table, and consequently, the dialogue.  Conversely, Stout’s standard of justification 
promotes an awareness and understanding of the context of the perspective in question 
and hence seems to be more conducive to forging a more inclusive standard of 
incorporation into the dialogue.  
Thirdly, valuing openness must not only be characteristic of one who is to judge 
that which is justified but also of the interlocutors engaged in the dialogic process which 
is required for pragmatic perspectivism to work.  In order for such a methodology to be 
successful, those involved in the creation of guidelines must be open to considering the 
perspective of others and willing to acknowledge that shared values and/or concepts may 
be had amongst otherwise conflicting positions.  Hence, employing the more contextually 
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sensitive notion of justification as our standard for entering into the dialogue, we 
ultimately resolve the contractarian concern without having to resort to definitions of 
reasonableness, or excluding some from the dialogue.    
Furthermore, Ortega has claimed that perspectives which claim absolute authority 
and neglect the perspectives of others are those which must be false.  As a scholar of 
Ortega, Julian Marias stated that for Ortega, “Falsity consists…in making a particular 
point of view absolute; that is, forgetting the perspective quality of every vision” (375 
Marias).  Similarly, Stout writes, “Religious recognition of the faithful as a common body 
and of the need to conform oneself to the best available understanding of what 
membership in that body involves can be fleshed out in many ways, only the most 
extreme of which deserve to be impugned….” (Stout 2004, 280-281). Hence, by 
amending Ortega’s claim, changing ‘falsity’ to ‘unjustifiability’, we can incorporate such 
a notion into our methodology.  In addition, following Stout’s suggestion we may wish to 
consider those perspectives that are laden with internal contradictions and inconsistencies 
to be unjustified as well.    
Consequently, it may be argued that those beliefs and attitudes which are to be 
excluded from the dialogue are those that are laden with internal contradictions, 
completely refuse to listen to the perspective of the other, and completely deny that other 
perspectives will be able to justify some of the same moral claims as one’s own. We may 
judge such a point of view itself to be unjustified, regardless of the justifiability of other 
beliefs in its overall conceptual network, for given the nature of the process itself it is not 
absolute truth which is being sought but rather where common conceptions of what is 
absolutely true amongst distinct perspectives exist.   
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Every methodology has its biases, preconceptions, and values.  To lay one’s 
values on the table at the outset is crucial for such a method of discourse to be 
constructive.  Hence, by entering into such a dialogic arrangement one is agreeing to 
immerse oneself in a conceptual framework in which certain values and goals are 
acknowledged from the outset. Pragmatic perspectivism presents a framework in which 
“openness” and “consensus” are valued, the justifiability of distinct beliefs coming from 
distinct paradigms is acknowledged as a sound possibility, and conceptual overlap is not 
only valued and acknowledged as being plausible but is to some extent part of the 
teleology of the interlocutor.  Without the acknowledgment of these factors, a multi-
perspective pluralistic framework will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.  
Furthermore, insofar as this method entails coming to an understanding of the 
perspective of the other during a continual discursive process and that one of the aims of 
pragmatic perspectivism is to seek conceptual links amongst various perspectives 
(whether such commonalities exist on the metaphysical or ontological level or on the 
socio-ethical level) a key element of this process will be that of comparison.  In other 
words this dialogue needs to be a comparative endeavor which seeks to produce a series 
of agreements and/or compatible propositions. Thus, in that dialogue often involves 
comparison, and what we are dealing with here is the relationship between religious 
pluralism and an ethical enterprise, I would like to briefly introduce some ideas found 
within the methodological discussions of comparative religious ethics, which can 
supplement our aforementioned conceptual framework.   
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Consensus via Comparison 
 Discussing methodological issues of comparative studies, Thomas Lewis 
maintains that a question should be posited as a means of framing the comparison, or in 
other words a question should be raised as a means of creating an ad hoc and revisable 
frame in which dialogue and comparative analysis may occur. He states that these frames 
do not have to be grounded in anything resembling a ‘universal human experience’ and 
may be as inclusive or exclusive as the particular situation calls for.  He states, “…the 
frame need not define a universal category of human experience in order to be fruitful for 
comparing a number of thinkers from different traditions” (Lewis 2005, 229).  Lewis’s 
notion of employing a question is helpful for our endeavor, for often bioethical issues 
may be easily presented in the form of questions, and insofar as that which we are 
striving for is some common responses to such questions.   Moreover, Lewis’s ideas are 
helpful in that he recognizes that comparison is a necessary element of dialogue and vice 
versa, and both dialogue and a quest for conceptual similarities are aims of pragmatic 
perspectivism.  Lewis writes, “Locating various views within this frame, however, is not 
merely a matter of positing them as there but also entail situating them in relation to each 
other….The process of situating the perspective in relation to each other presupposes that 
the alternative views can be brought into some sort of dialogue with each other” (Lewis 
2005, 232-233).   
 In addition to incorporating Lewis’s contributions to the field of comparative 
religious ethics, I would also like to incorporate some of the ideas found in the work of 
Aaron Stalnaker, who also has addressed methodological issues in comparative religious 
ethics.  Drawing heavily on Lee Yearly’s idea of analogical imagination, Stalnaker 
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introduces the notion of “bridge concepts” as a means of conducting comparative studies 
in religion.  Stalnaker’s “bridge concepts” are chosen prior to the comparison and must 
have both as little content as possible and analogous terms in each of the traditions being 
studied.  They create a basic thematic connection at the outset and may be enriched and 
expounded upon as the study progresses.   
Discussing Stalnaker’s contribution to the field of comparative religious ethics 
Elizabeth Barre writes, “According to Stalnaker, ‘Bridge concepts provide limited, 
thematic links to guide comparison, and yet are still open to greater specification in 
particular cases.’” (Barre 2004, 17).  Stalnaker’s idea of “bridge concepts” works well 
with our pragmatic perspectivist conceptual framework insofar as that which we are 
seeking is the link between perspectives.  However, where Stalnaker is dealing primarily 
with textual analysis, and hence proposes that such concepts be created in the mind of the 
scholar prior to the comparison itself, we are dealing with actual dialogue. Hence, we 
must seek to discover such conceptual bridges through the dialogic process itself.  If such 
an amendment is made to Stalnaker’s method, and we employ both Lewis’ and 
Stalnaker’s ideas in tandem with one another, we are left with a means of implementing 
our conceptual framework in bioethical practice.    
 
Putting Theory into Practice 
We are presented with a society in which bioethical issues are of growing concern 
and in which specific modes of reasoning coming from specific traditions are commonly 
employed as means of addressing and resolving such issues.  Hence, we begin by inviting 
a number of parties coming from a variety of distinct religious, cultural, and intellectual 
traditions, to come together to engage in a series of dialogues on a number of distinct 
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bioethical issues.  These issues will range from matters such as brain death, on both the 
clinical and policy levels, to the very principles or standards which guide the field itself.   
Once a group of participants willing to engage in such an open dialogue has come 
together, we begin the conversation by positing a specific question, as to provide a 
direction and some parameters for our discussion and a frame of comparison for the 
various responses to such a question.   
It would be impossible to hold a constructive discussion in regards to the entire 
range of bioethical issues, hence the question will be one regarding a particular issue, 
such as “brain death,” or if need be a specific subtopic related to that issue, such as 
“whole brain death” versus “cortical brain death,” or conscience clauses attached to 
policies regarding “brain death.”  To bolster this method Stout claims, “our concern is 
practical and quite limited….The relevant comparison-class is relatively narrow….What 
respects of comparison matter?  Mainly, the differences most responsible for creating or 
sustaining conflict and the similarities most likely to facilitate settlement” (Stout 2004, 
229).   In addition to merely positing a question and hearing the responses, once the 
dialogue has begun interlocutors and moderators alike must be open to, and search for, 
the appearance of conceptual links present amongst the various perspectives and 
positions being espoused. It is crucial for each individual involved in the discursive 
process to take part in the comparison. The reason is two-fold: firstly, different 
perspectives may be able to detect different conceptual links, and secondly, different 
individuals may be able to interpret those conceptual similarities differently, which 
increases the chances of finding ways for a given similarity to be meaningful when 
applied to the ethical issue under discussion.    
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We employ Stalnaker’s idea of “bridge concepts” once a question has been posed.  
There are certain concepts whose relevance will be immediately evident to those 
participating, such as conceptions of “death” or “human nature” when discussing issues 
surrounding “brain death.” These concepts may be tentatively employed as markers of 
where to search for similarities and differences. During the course of the dialogue, such 
concepts will become more refined and possibly altered.  If at the outset we being with a 
vague notion which is to serve as a potential “bridge concept” and we find that either no 
such concept exists in one of the group’s traditional worldviews or that it does exist yet it 
is not significantly valued within that conceptual paradigm, then such a concept must 
either be abandoned or revised and amended if it is to serve as a conceptual link amongst 
divergent perspectives.   
For instance, if the discussion revolves around the very principles of bioethics and 
one begins with a question regarding “autonomy,” we may find that such a concept is not 
emphasized in East Asian societies and finds no substantive counterpart in the Confucian 
worldview, per se. In such a case, “autonomy” must be either discarded or re-
conceptualized if it is to serve as a “bridge concept.”   
Ruiping Fan, a Confucian bioethicist, discusses the inapplicability of the concept 
of “autonomy” in both Confucian and other Asian models of bioethics.14  He discusses 
the emphasis that such religio-cultural traditions place upon the role of the family as a 
single entity. Hence, he promotes a family based concept of ethical decision-making in 
medicine.  Fan states,  
                                                 
14 In a similar vain, Andrew Fagan, a British Human Rights theorist, also critiques the principle of 
autonomy, demonstrating how such a principle is incompatible with most Asian, including Hindu, systems 
of morality. For more information see Fagan, “Challenging Autonomy,” 15-31.   
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The Confucian way of life is familistic….Confucians hold that family 
members should be interdependent, rather than independent of each 
other….The family is central to Confucian moral and political theory.  In 
particular, Confucianism recognizes the family as an entity with social 
properties that cannot be reduced to the properties of its members (Fan 
2004, 185-188).   
 
While Fan continually criticizes the Western notions of “autonomy” and attempts 
to debunk universalism throughout his works, the idea of self-determination of a singular 
entity may be found in his work if the family is conceived of as a singular entity with a 
single socio-ethical identity and with the ability to partake in moral decision-making.  
Given the Confucian emphasis on the family unit, a re-conceptualization of our “bridge 
concept” may entail a broadening of the notion of “autonomy” as to account for families 
as autonomous entities with the ability for self-determination.  In this way ‘autonomy’ 
need not necessarily be expunged but rather reformulated as to more adequately represent 
distinct modes of decision-making.  Now, this is not necessarily an endorsement of such a 
view of autonomy nor is it an assertion that every Confucian would necessarily accept 
such a view.  Rather this is meant to serve as an illustration of how we may go about 
reformulating “bridge concepts” and attempting to forge some type of conceptual links 
amongst distinct modes of thought.    
As the dialogue proceeds, “bridge concepts” may be reformulated and new 
conceptual links may be discovered, leaving us in a position in which we can begin to 
posit new questions as to reframe the conversation.  For example, if a Christian and a 
Buddhist discuss “brain death,” we may come across concepts such as “respect for the 
wholeness of the organism” and a concern for “multi-system breakdown,” as would be 
the case if Greek Orthodox theologian and ethicist Stanley Harakas and Buddhist scholar 
Damien Keown were involved in a dialogue on this issue.  Allyne Smith discusses 
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Harakas’s position stating, “Father Stanley Harakas, the doyen of Orthodox ethicists in 
America, offers as a standard view the position that death occurs when there is a multi-
system breakdown…. ‘Dying begins when interrelated body systems break down, 
impairing normal living processes.  Death occurs when the systematic breakdown 
becomes irreversible and cannot be sustained’….Elsewhere, Harakas sees this systematic 
breakdown as marked by brain death” (Smith 2000, 8).   To reiterate Keown’s Buddhist 
position, “our understanding of death must accordingly be as the death of the whole 
psychophysical organism rather than any one of its parts….Buddhism would accept 
brain-stem death as the criterion of death for a human being.  Brainstem death means that 
the patient has lost irreversibly the capacity for integrated organic functioning” (Keown 
2001, 156).  
Hence, questions such as “what is wholeness of the organism?” or “what is a 
multi-system breakdown?” might be posited as a means of refining our inter-
paradigmatic understanding and furthering the dialogue.  Once such conceptual links are 
found and some level of agreement is had, the initial question may be readdressed and 
discussed in such a way that new modes of achieving consensus may be illuminated.  
Even if there is an initial agreement on a particular issue, an ongoing dialogue is 
still required. Even if all of the parties involved accept “brain death,” and again agree on 
a subsequent topic, such as the “whole brain” standard of death, each party involved may 
endorse “whole brain death” for different reasons, as was the case in our aforementioned 
discussion of Keown and Eberl.  Each participant may be employing distinct modes of 
moral reasoning or distinct conceptual apparatuses, stemming from distinct conceptual 
paradigms, in order to justify the very same propositions.  Thus, to require a continuation 
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of the dialogue will enable a deeper understanding of each party’s modes of reasoning 
and conceptual schema and hence will promote a greater comprehension of the others’ 
paradigms and worldviews.  When consensus is conceptualized as on-going and 
dialogical rather than static and momentary, what we are presented with is a means of 
furthering interlocutors’ understanding of the modes of reasoning and paradigms of the 
others.  
Furthermore, continuing dialogue even after a certain level of agreement is 
achieved may potentially decrease the level of conflict present when discussing other 
bioethical issues that the parities might not necessarily agree upon. Being exposed to 
different ways of justifying a proposition that one already accepts as true may not only 
give that individual new insights on the problem at hand but may promote dialogue and 
understanding in an environment that is less confrontational than one where a serious 
disagreement was had. Hence one may feel less inclined to put up defensive barriers that 
can occlude one’s openness and willingness to fully understand and engage the 
perspective of the other.  This is where consensus must be seen as an on-going dialogic 
process.  Once such conceptual links are found in an agreeable environment when the 
interlocutors move to a discussion of a topic in which they tend to disagree they will 
already be armed with an arsenal of conceptual similarities.  The interlocutors can then 
employ these conceptual similarities as means of exploring their various perspectives on 
this new and different topic. “Because the entire practice is involved, not merely the 
ideals abstracted from that practice, a common morality can only be achieved piecemeal, 
by gradually building discursive bridges and networks of trust in particular settings” 
(Stout 2004, 226).  
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However, one may wish to claim that even if consensus in regards to a set of 
ethical guidelines is secured there may still be disagreement regarding the importance and 
application of such guidelines.  They may be interpreted in radically different ways by 
different individuals and different groups.  Firstly, in response to such a concern, given 
the nature of the pragmatic perspectivist method there is an attempt to respect such 
interpretive differences from the outset in that no one is required to alter or amend their 
religious paradigm or modes of reasoning.  The similarity and compatibility of concepts 
must not be conflated with identicality, and consensus must not be conflated with 
unanimity.  By allowing and encouraging distinct perspectives to justify similar concepts 
in their own unique ways, pragmatic perspectivism acknowledges that their will be 
hermeneutical differences from the outset, yet does not see this as a threat to possibility 
of consensus, as it is envisioned in this method.   
Secondly, if we incorporate David Hollenbach’s notion of “Indigenous Pluralism” 
into our dialogical process itself we may be able to allow for a degree of interpretive 
differences and still work toward an overall general consensus regarding particular issues.  
“Indigenous Pluralism” states that religious traditions must look within their own 
paradigms of thought for ways of respecting the interpretive differences of other 
traditions (Hollenbach 1998).   While this is a novel concept, we need not alter our 
methodological model in order to incorporate this notion into our framework.  Prima 
facie indigenous pluralism seems to be compatible with pragmatic perspectivism.  We 
can request that the various tradition’s present in the dialogue look for indigenous 
concepts of respecting pluralism itself, at least in regards to a particular issue and given 
certain agreed upon parameters. Hence, a concept, such as “hermeneutical diversity,” 
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could potentially serve as a subsequent “bridge concept”.  Thus, we may be able to move 
toward the establishment of subsidiary principles or clauses which would allow for such 
hermeneutical differences from within the structure of the agreed upon guidelines.  In this 
way a degree of interpretive difference could be allowed and supported by the various 
perspectives and may be justified not by a foreign mode of reasoning but from within the 
parameters of each interlocutor’s own epistemic context.   
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Chapter 4 
Pragmatic Perspectivism Applied 
 
To illustrate how pragmatic perspectivism would look in practice, I would like to 
examine a number of cases in which consensus on a bioethical issue was a primary goal 
and in which tensions emerged as a result of moral and religious difference and diversity.  
Afterwards I will demonstrate how if applied to such cases and utilized in these 
scenarios, pragmatic perspectivism has the potential to both ameliorate some of the 
existing tensions and to facilitate the attainment of the goals of such processes.  
 
 
Real World Bioethics: 
From Politics to Clinics 
 
Case 1: Religious Voices in the Public Arena 
 Firstly, I would like to reintroduce a case raised earlier in Chapter 1, namely the 
case of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission’s attempt to incorporate religious 
perspectives into its deliberation of the issues of stem cell research and cloning which 
Fox and Messikomer cite and discuss in their article “The Presence and Influence of 
Religion in American Bioethics.” On February 24, 1997 the NBAC had 90 days to issue 
its conclusive report on the legality and ethicality of cloning in general.  In regards to its 
report on stem cell research, “The NBAC convened a special meeting on 7 May 1999 of 
11 ‘prominent scholars of religious ethics’ to hear ‘their traditions’ views’ about moral 
and religious questions that this type of research raises’” (NBAC 1999, p.99; Messikomer 
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et al. 2001, 501).  Before discussing the case in any detail, Messikomer et al note, “The 
NBAC has no religionist among its 18 commissioners” (Messikomer et al 2001, 499).   
Discussing the format of the meetings and the intentions of the Commission, 
Messikomer et al state,  
The NBAC’s hearings on cloning and on stem cell research included 
testimony by invited speakers from five major religious traditions: 
Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Islamic, and for stem cell research, 
Eastern Orthodox.  The NBAC also commissioned a review and analysis 
of Religious Perspective on Cloning by Courtney Campbell, a religious 
studies scholar and bioethicist….[T]he Commission “believed” that it was 
“especially important”—even “crucial”—that it “inform itself about the 
range, content, and rationale of various ethical positions” regarding 
cloning and human stem cell research that derived from “a variety of 
religious traditions”…. The NBAC sought “to determine whether these 
various religious traditions, despite their distinctive sources of authority 
and argumentation, reach[ed] similar conclusions,” with the aspiration of 
finding a “convergence of views across [them]” (NBAC 1997, p.7; 
Messikomer et al 2001, 501). 
 
  However, it must be noted that NBAC still maintained a concern for the 
separation of Church and State which is expressed in the report’s statement, “…in a 
pluralistic society particular religious view cannot be determinative for public policy 
decisions that bind everyone” (NBAC 1997, p.7; Messikomer et al 2001, 502).    
From the outset there are two problematic features of the NBAC’s hearings, 
which together may be summarized as a problem with both the aims of its intention and 
its means of achieving such ends.  The first problem is with its methodology and the 
other is with its aims in general.  Rather than inviting the “religionists”, so to speak, to 
join their discussions as contributors to the dialogue and equal partners in the discursive 
process itself, they were invited to give “testimony”.  “Testimony” involves a speaking-at 
or a speaking-to rather than a speaking-with.  This testimonial method fails to actually 
include these individuals in the conversation and hence excludes their perspectives from 
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the actual deliberative process itself.  Rather, these perspectives are objectified in the 
sense that they become static objects of reflection by the commissioners and hence are 
not part of the communal reflective processes which are taking place.   
Secondly, there is a major problem with the intentions of the commission, which 
in large part gives rise to the problematic nature of its method.  The Commission sought 
to inform itself about such perspectives rather than attempting to actually engage such 
perspectives.  In addition, the Commission itself aspired to find a convergence of views 
amongst these various religious perspectives, yet did so without having the 
representatives of those perspectives fully engaged as interlocutors. Having the 
religionists as interlocutors would have been more fruitful in that they would be able to 
clarify misconceptions and would be better equipped to determine where a particular 
concept espoused by another was either akin or compatible to a concept present in one’s 
own paradigm of thought.  Without a full-fledge inter-faith and interdisciplinary 
dialogue, consensus will be extremely difficult to achieve because dialogue encourages 
mutual recognition of the similarities and differences and compatibility and 
incompatibility of concepts and aims amongst paradigms.   
Conversely, in a testimonial and informative context, like that which occurred in 
the NBAC, the analysis and examination is highly superficial and one-dimensional.  It is 
superficial insofar as all the commission has to work with is freestanding conceptual 
elements of each tradition which it then attempts to compare rather than witnessing the 
interaction of worldviews and being a part of the relational process themselves.   It is 
one-dimensional insofar as it is only the commissioners who attempt to detect and 
compare concepts.  Given that the commission itself is secular it is highly likely that a 
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predominantly secular hermeneutic, or mode of interpretation, was placed upon the 
information acquired.  This is a disadvantage when one is trying to find a convergence of 
perspectives. Insofar as the religionists may be able to interpret the concepts of others in 
such a manner as to illuminate modes of compatibility between their concepts and those 
of others, which may otherwise have been overlooked, such a multi-perspectival 
interpretive schema and mode of discursive interaction is crucial to the pragmatic 
perspectivist methodology.  
Further, the one-dimensionality present in the case of the NBAC is inherent in the 
structure of the hearing itself, for it involved a group of observers (the commission), 
situated as a subject viewing a set of facts or phenomena, which in turn are situated as 
objects. Conversely, pragmatic perspectivism situates all parties involved in a dynamic 
and discursive process that entails multi-dimensional subject to subject relations and the 
consideration of many distinct interpretive stances, both of which the NBAC hearings 
lacked. It is not a surprise then that what Messikomer et al reports is that not much 
progress was made.  Messikomer et al state,  
Virtually the only insights that the NBAC seems to have derived and 
utilized from the religious testimony it heard regarding the prospect of 
human cloning were equivocal at best.  They were summarized in the 
recommendation section of the cloning report in the following way:   
“Religious positions on human cloning are pluralistic in their premises, 
modes of argument and conclusions.  Nevertheless, several major themes 
are prominent in Jewish, Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Islamic 
positions, including responsible human dominion over nature, human 
dignity and destiny, procreation, and family life….” (NBAC 1997, pp. 
103-104)….Conceptually and empirically, the inconclusive conclusions 
about religious perspectives on cloning at which the NBAC arrived fell far 
short of identifying common grounds for reaching the “convergence of 
religious view” to which they had aspired. (Messikomer et al 2001, 503) 
 
   
  79
If pragmatic perspectivism were applied to the above situation involving 
religionists and the NBAC, both the commissioners and religionists would have had an 
equal voice in the matter in that all parties would have been situated as interlocutors in a 
greater dialogue revolving around a single question, in this case “Is the cloning of a 
human individual an ethically permissible act?”  Despite a motley assortment of 
responses comprised of “yes”, “no”, and “sometimes, depending on the situation,” the 
dialogue would not come to a halt.  Rather, the question as to why each party gave the 
response they did would be probed further in an attempt to discover some commonly 
shared concepts, be they directly related to cloning per se or not.   
Take for example the concept of “human dignity,” which the Commission itself 
found to be of common concern.  This may then be employed as a “bridge concept,” so 
we could move to questions such as “what does human dignity entail,” “why is human 
dignity important to you,” and “in what manner do you see cloning as either compatible 
or incompatible with your conception of human dignity?” Now, such questions would not 
be presented all at once but rather one by one with ample time given for deliberation and 
discussion to be had as to promote a mutual recognition of the modes of reasoning 
employed by each person. That which would be given attention is not only the distinct 
interpretations of human nature which the participants espoused but also the distinct 
comparative interpretations of each interlocutor as well.  Having a number of 
perspectives present in the comparative process is as important as having many 
perspectives present their views on a given topic.  Different interpretive lenses may not 
only be a cause of disagreement but may be able to provide new insights as to where 
commonalities exist and where conceptual bridges may be formed.  Different interpreters 
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may perceive different conceptual links amongst the various perspectives and hence, may 
increase the chances of arriving at consensus. 
We can not expect consensus to be achieved after a body of ‘impartial’ observes 
examines the brief testimonies of a few individuals over a relatively short period of time. 
If the aim is consensus or conceptual convergence, which indeed it was in the case of the 
NBAC, an on-going process of dialogue, in which no single mode of reasoning is given 
authority or privilege, must be initiated.  Otherwise, all we are presented with is a failed 
attempt at coming to terms with pluralism that is unable to produce substantive 
resolutions to the problems of religio-moral diversity.   
 
Case 2: Religious Belief in the Clinic  
Now, in regards to the problems and issues which arise in a clinical setting, 
pragmatic perspectivism recognizes that many of the moral dilemmas and ethical 
disagreements which occur in clinical settings are a product of the clash between 
divergent moral systems and worldviews.  Thus, universal principles and rationalistic 
modes of moral deliberation may not always be the best means of ameliorating the 
tensions in such cases for they themselves are representative of a single moral paradigm 
and mode of reasoning. By attempting to create policies, guidelines, and standards which 
are more adequately representative of society’s moral diversity, pragmatic perspectivism 
aims to minimize, though it may not always resolve, the potential conflicts in particular 
cases through a top down approach.  This approach attempts to provide flexible starting 
points for moral deliberation which are themselves begotten through a bottom-up 
dialogical exchange amongst diverse perspectives.  Moreover, it is intended to serve as a 
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framework which may help ensure and facilitate an atmosphere of openness to diverse 
religious points of view in particular clinical situations.          
 In Clinical Pragmatism and Difference, Joseph Fins presents a case involving a 
religious objection to brain death and goes on to demonstrate how clinical pragmatism 
was used to ameliorate some of the tensions that arose.  Before discussing the details of 
the case however, Fins notes that he practices medicine in New York, a state where 
concessions are made in regards to religious objections to brain death and an area of the 
country which attempts to accommodate divergent religious beliefs.  Fins states, 
 
The New York State Department of Health developed a policy on brain 
death.  It requires that hospitals establish a ‘procedure for the reasonable 
individual’s religious or moral objection to the determination as expressed 
by the individual, or by the next of kin or other person closest to the 
individual.’ Although New York law deviates from the Uniform 
determination of Death Act accepted in 48 states, the law in New Jersey is 
even more expansive with respect to the accommodation of religious 
objections to brain death determinations.  (Fins 1998, 70-71)    
 
Fins proceeds to report that a Hassidic Jewish family’s two-year-old son Jacob 
had a brain tumor, for which he underwent chemotherapy.  Subsequently, Jacob 
developed a herniation in his brain. The herniation progressed, which led doctors to 
suspect that he might be brain dead.  In order to determine brain death, two apnea tests 
are required.  The first one was performed and the child showed no signs of spontaneous 
breathing.  However, before the second apnea test was performed the boy’s mother 
objected to such a test on religious grounds.  As Hasidic Jews the woman and her family 
did not accept brain death as a demarcation of death.  At this point Fins notes that the boy 
had not been declared to be legally brain dead yet due to the lack of a second 
confirmatory apnea test.  Fins reports that in order to better comprehend the patient’s 
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perspective, he himself began to consider the ambiguity of brain death and began to 
familiarize himself with the patient’s religious and cultural traditions.  He proposes that 
this be done either through self-study or through the incorporation of another member of 
the patient’s religious group, who is knowledgeable about such matters, into the dialogue 
(Fins 1998, 70-72).     
Subsequently, Fins and the family held a series of meetings.  Fins states, “In those 
meetings we sought to identify the range of moral considerations that might be common 
to our secular approach and their religiously informed view of the child’s situation…” 
(Fins 1998, 73).  As the meetings continued they realized that defining death and the 
question as to the status of the boy were not resolvable. Hence, they proceeded to reframe 
the problem, Fins writes, “We asked how the Jewish law would interpret the conflicting 
mandates to preserve life and not prolong the dying process.  Instead of struggling over a 
definition of brain death, we engaged the observant family, on their own terms…”  (Fins 
1998, 73).  Ultimately, the family agreed to withdraw some of the elements of the ICU 
support and the boy died as a result of cardiopulmonary arrest (Fins 1998, 72-73).        
At this point one may observe that the methodology of pragmatic perspectivism 
resembles that of clinical pragmatism.  The main difference, however, is that whereas 
clinical pragmatism is a methodology for achieving consensus between individual 
patients and individual doctors, as illustrated by the aforementioned case, pragmatic 
perspectivism proposes a methodology for creating the ethical guidelines and policies 
which are to be upheld by the clinic itself.  Despite a number of theoretical differences, if 
it were to be amended and applied to particular clinical situations pragmatic 
perspectivism would indeed resemble what Joseph Fins has dubbed “Clinical 
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Pragmatism” when put into practice.  However, it must be made clear that this is not the 
primary intention or purpose of pragmatic perspectivism.  In addition, this should not be 
taken as an endorsement of the outcomes of and decisions made in this particular case.  
Rather, this is merely an exploration of an actual case in which religious differences 
presented a problem for bioethical decision-making and in which a form of pragmatic 
dialogue was implemented as a means of resolving the problem. 
One may ask, “why not simply amend clinical pragmatism so that it may be 
applied on the policy level and in regards to the guiding principles themselves?”  In 
response, while clinical pragmatism is well-suited for the task it has set out to accomplish 
-- namely, to ameliorate tensions and prevent conflicts that arise in individual cases -- it is 
not well-suited to achieve the goals of pragmatic perspectivism; although the two may 
work in tandem as supplementary approaches.    
Firstly, by its very nature, clinical pragmatism is concerned with individual cases 
and is strictly a case by case methodological approach.  It applies the medical diagnostic 
framework of differential diagnosis to individual moral cases.  Fins states,  
Clinical pragmatism uses an inductive method of problem solving that is 
analogous to differential diagnosis.  In the process of differential diagnosis 
clinicians translate the details of a specific patient’s history and physical 
examination into a range of plausible and generalizible diagnoses that will 
allow therapeutic interventions.  Analogously, clinical pragmatism 
operates through a shared process of investigation, planning, decision-
making, and action in which all the stakeholders concerned with the moral 
problem collaborate to create an ethically appropriate consensus. (Fins 
1998, 69)   
 
Secondly, it seems too idealistic to presuppose that every doctor will be both 
willing and able to undergo thorough self-study of the patient’s tradition or that a member 
of that patient’s faith who is knowledgeable about his tradition’s views on brain death or 
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other bioethical issues will always be available.  Hence, this is where pragmatic 
perspectivism endorses having a number of different perspectives present on the actual 
ethics board of the hospital itself.  Yet, this need not necessarily entail that an Orthodox 
Jewish theologian be a member of every hospital’s ethics committee.  Rather it suggests 
that someone who is knowledgeable of Orthodox Jewish perspectives, and also people 
familiar with other religious perspectives for that matter, be members of such a 
committee or that the committee is at least willing to consult with such individuals.  
Additionally, it seems that the need for and usefulness of a highly pluralistic ethics 
committee would be greater for hospitals located in more diverse areas.  Subsequently, it 
may be the case that in more religiously and culturally homogenous areas it might be 
unnecessary for hospitals to have such diverse ethics committees.   
Moreover, even where pluralistic ethics committees would be beneficial, I am not 
claiming that in each particular scenario members of every tradition need to be involved 
in the decision-making process.  Rather, it is meant to ensure that the committee has had 
familiarity with a number of perspectives prior to the actual clinical dilemma and that 
openness to distinct perspectives is maintained.  Moreover, it is meant to help ensure that 
religious beliefs are taken seriously in clinical situations.   
Lastly, clinical pragmatism presupposes the existence of generalized ethical 
diagnoses, so to speak, and seeks situational consensus on these pre-established ethical 
principles.  In addition, it presupposes that the policies of the region and/or hospital in 
which this method is to be practiced are conducive with the principles and values of the 
methodology itself.  Conversely, pragmatic perspectivism seeks to create more pluralistic 
guidelines.  Pragmatic perspectivism is meant to serve as a means of creating the very 
   
  85
ethical generalizations, guidelines, policies and pluralistic atmosphere which clinical 
pragmatism seems to presuppose.   
While this is not an attempt to synthesize pragmatic perspectivism and clinical 
pragmatism nor is it necessarily an endorsement of clinical pragmatism, it is being 
suggested that pragmatic perspectivism and clinical pragmatism may be complementary 
methodologies. By creating more pluralistic generalized guidelines, pragmatic 
perspectivism may give clinical pragmatism a set of ethical diagnoses which are better 
suited for the religiously diverse situations it encounters and serves as a method for 
creating the groundwork needed to facilitate the clinical pragmatic method.  In this way, 
the two methods may be able to work in tandem with another as to create a medical 
ethical system which is well-rounded in its pluralistic approach.     
 
*** 
As the above cases have demonstrated, pragmatic perspectivism may be a viable 
means of creating a pluralistic bioethics.  Its feasibility resides in the fact that it is neither 
a normative theory, in the traditional sense of postulating absolute truths or espousing 
legalistic ethical prescriptions, nor is it merely a critique of the current state of bioethics 
or other bioethical theories.  It does not deny the insights and benefits of the various 
normative theories which are currently being employed and does not attempt to dismiss 
or discard those theories or the progress which they have enabled the field to achieve.  
Rather, it is intended to be a practically applicable yet theoretically sound method of 
confronting the moral diversity and ethical disagreement that has emerged in bioethics as 
a result of the religious and cultural pluralism that pervades our society.  Pragmatic 
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perspectivism presents us with a new method of engaging and incorporating the views of 
the otherwise disparate and opposing perspectives held by those coming from a wide 
range of circumstances, including academics, policy-makers, clinicians, and members of 
various religions.       
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Chapter 5 
Summary & Conclusions 
 
Scientific and medical technologies and advancements have had a tremendous 
impact on our lives on a variety of levels.  The benefits of many of these advancements is 
unquestionable however, biomedical technology’s rapid progress has raised a plethora 
new ethically challenging questions and moral dilemmas.  In addition to providing 
humanity with new life-saving capabilities and procedures which have opened up new 
possibilities of doing good for others these advancements have forced us to question our 
conceptions of life itself and have created practices whose ethical status is uncertain.   
Consequently,  the interdisciplinary field of bioethics has emerged in an attempt to 
resolve some these new ethical dilemmas, to answer some of these difficult and pressing 
questions, and ultimately to protect society from the potential harms of biomedical 
innovations.   
However, the ethical challenges and moral dilemmas which the biomedical 
sciences have presented us with have warranted a multitude of responses coming from all 
quarters of our social landscape.  Aside from responding directly to ethical questions 
posed by science, bioethics faces another challenge:  those speaking from highly distinct 
points of view, including legal, medical and clinical, theological and religious, 
philosophical, and anthropological and sociological perspectives wish to have their 
voices heard and are all vying for a place within the bioethical arena.  As a result, 
bioethicists struggle to make sense of these varied and disparate voices in their attempts 
to give adequate responses to the biomedical issues themselves.   
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Having paid special attention to religious pluralism, the issue of confronting this 
moral diversity within a bioethical context has been the topic of our discussion. We have 
explored the viability of forging a pluralistic bioethics in which this panoply of distinct 
voices may not only be heard but also respected and ultimately represented in the process 
of forging policies and principles that are to serve as the guidelines of this new field and 
which are meant to protect the different members of our diverse society.   
 While religio-moral pluralism is indeed a greater social problem extending 
beyond the bioethical context, the moral diversity and religious pluralism which pervades 
bioethics is rather unique in that, unlike the socio-political arena, many bioethical 
questions and problems move beyond the purely moral and social realms.  These 
bioethical problems do not merely touch upon, but directly raise and engage a wide 
variety of metaphysical and ontological questions and concerns.  Recognizing this fact, 
bioethics has long sought the input of those commentators whose expertise could aid in 
the resolution of the various conceptual conundrums that appear time and time again in 
this field of inquiry.  Hence, as we have seen, philosophers and theologians secured their 
place in the field from the outset.   
However, with the goal of universal applicability, bioethics has understandably 
secularized itself.  Holding secular and rational principles begotten from analytic modes 
of philosophical thought, and inevitably being highly reliant upon the input of those in 
the medical and legal professions, bioethicists have tended to marginalize religious voices 
in regards to both public policies and the principles which are meant to guide our actions 
and decision-making.  Now, while philosophy is definitely well equipped to deal with the 
difficult ethical, metaphysical, and ontological issues which biomedical advancements 
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have called into question, it is often towards religion that many people turn for answers to 
such questions.  Hence, as we have seen throughout the course of this study, there have 
recently been a series of critiques launched against the more traditional modes of 
bioethical deliberation, all of which call attention to and have attempted to provide 
solutions for bioethics’ inherent problem of pluralism and the ethical disagreements that 
have emerged.   
The primary problem that we have been grappling with is what Daniel Callahan 
has referred to as the problem of “universalism vs. particularism.”  During the course of 
this study we have encountered a number of theories and methodological suggestions, all 
of which ultimately address this issue.  However it has been argued that many of these 
methodological attempts to create a more pluralistic bioethics have proved inadequate 
when it comes to addressing the complexity of religious beliefs and moral paradigms 
which guide many people’s decision-making processes in biomedical ethical contexts.  
While all of these methods, including those of the social scientists, contractarians, and 
pragmatists, have their merits, it has been suggested that they may not provide the best 
means of creating a truly pluralistic bioethical framework and hence, may not be our best 
options when attempting to deal with the problem of religious pluralism.   
While respectful of the uniqueness of different religious traditions and calling for 
the recognition and incorporation of distinct modes of moral reasoning in the bioethical 
framework, ethnographic bioethics lacks the normative structure needed to carry out such 
a task.  Providing a method that avoids universal truth claims and promotes discourse and 
consensus, contract theory is still highly reliant upon overly-rationalistic modes of ethical 
inquiry, a limited and static notion of agreement, a specific conception of the human self, 
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and a particular notion of reasonability which gives rise to an overtly exclusionary 
attitude toward a number of religious beliefs.  Putting forth a dialogical model of inquiry 
that avoids universalism or the discovery of absolute truth, and which encourages an on-
going conception of dialogue and an attitude of inclusiveness, the various forms of 
pragmatism are overly reliant upon scientific methodology, neglect the importance of the 
metaphysical, and emphasize change in such a manner that they open the door to a 
number of potentially exclusionary and disrespectful consequences for religious 
traditions.       
Attempting to avoid the pitfalls of the aforementioned theories, while attempting 
to retain their respective benefits I have attempted to forge a methodology that can walk 
the fine line between universalism and particularism and which may serve as the 
foundation of a bioethics for a secular yet religiously pluralistic society.  Bearing the 
name pragmatic perspectivism this method aims to provide bioethics with a dialogical 
model of inquiry in which multiple perspectives are represented and in which discourse is 
not merely reduced to a conveyance of information.  Rather, in this context dialogue is 
meant to transcend a particular mode of reasoning as to fully engage the perspective of 
the other.  This method promotes both consensus and understanding with the realization 
that agreement is not always possible and that difference is inescapable and need not be 
dissolved or eradicated.  Pragmatic perspectivism is being suggested as a means of 
creating principles, policies, and guidelines that are adequately representative of the 
distinct voices and perspectives which constitute our pluralistic polity.  In its endeavor to 
do so, this method avoids the quest for absolute truths yet recognizes the practical need 
for guiding norms and principles.  Having demonstrated its potential to overcome or 
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possibly avoid the pitfalls of other methods for dealing with pluralism and having 
illustrated its applicability to a number of cases I have maintained that, as a conceptual 
framework and methodology, pragmatic perspectivism is a possible means of confronting 
religious pluralism and moral diversity in bioethics.  
Due to the novelty, complexity, and metaphysical nature of many bioethical 
issues, we must have a mutli-perspectival quest for solutions and to the best of our 
ability, attempt to accommodate a plurality of religious beliefs and philosophical 
positions.  What is truly at stake are indeed matters of life and death and questions of the 
nature of our existence itself.  It is my hope that this methodology will foster constructive 
inter-disciplinary and inter-faith dialogue on a range of highly complex and pressing 
biomedical ethical issues and will enable the creation of a more pluralistic bioethics.   
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